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# Discriminative Environmental Properties in Terrorist Environments--A Basis for Training

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
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Technical review by

George Lawton

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14. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words):  This final report describes a series of three interrelated studies addressing the nature of cues predictive of ambush or terrorist threat available to security force personnel in terrorist environments. The studies were as follows: 1. Eighty four actual or attempted ambush situations were reconstructed through interviews with police participants, analysis of records, etc. in Northern Ireland. 2. One single incident involving the eventual arrest of two RAF terrorists in the Netherlands was reconstructed and analyzed in detail through interviews with police participants, records, etc. 3. A series of observational analyses and experimental simulations were undertaken of selected examples of police patrol work in the Republic of Ireland. The studies are analyzed, presented, and discussed within a behavioral framework, drawing of the conceptual approach known as the rationale Choice Perspective. Police behavior in hostile environments is characterized as being under the discriminative control of critical environment cues, and the studies presented are analyzed in terms of the availability of cues to participants. Contrasts are made in terms of the process of control between rule governance vs. immediate contingency control.					
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This Second Year and Final Report <sup>1</sup> follows on from the Final Report of Contract Number DAJA45-86-M-0458 submitted in October, 1987 and the First Year Report of Contract DAJA45-88-C-0001 submitted in April 1989. It summarises the work undertaken in the project as a whole, relates the work described to the overall technical objectives of the project, and reflects in general on the significance and implications of the work undertaken.

### Technical Objectives

In the original proposal for Contract DAJA45-86-M-0458, the following technical objectives were set:

1. to identify and describe environmental and contextual cues that are available to experienced security force personnel and may be associated with terrorist threat;
2. in the theoretical context of Applied Behaviour Analysis, conduct experimental investigations to establish the discriminative stimulus properties of these cues and the characteristics of their relationships to relevant behaviour;
3. build on the foregoing to develop a rationale for designing training techniques.

These were to be achieved by:

- a. a literature review;
- b. the identification of individuals who might be successful at making judgements in appropriate work settings, and an exploration of their capacities through interview and empirical investigation;
- c. examinations of appropriate records.

The objectives set for Contract No. DAJA45-88-C-0001, developing from the above, were as follows.

a. In Year 2 to:

1. further refine and develop the analysis of selected incidents to identify salient discriminative

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qualities;

2. experimentally explore the role of cues identified as predictors of incidents, through simulation;
3. identify, and experimentally explore the role of cues clusters as discriminable environmental predictors of incidents, and determinants of police behaviour.

b. In year 3 to:

1. synthesise the experimental evidence on the role of cues environmental prediction of terrorist incidents, through further experimental explorations using complex discriminative environmental features;
2. develop from the experimental evidence available a systematic analysis of the features of the potential training initiatives;
3. the creation, and evaluation, of pilot learning packages embodying the knowledge gained in years two and three.

## Project Progress

Empirical work on the project has continued to be conducted in Northern Ireland, and The Republic of Ireland since the First Year Annual Report of April 1989, and analyses of both qualitative and quantitative results have been undertaken.

## PROJECT REVIEW

### 1. Empirical Work

The work on the project as a whole has been conducted on 3 sites. The activities developed in the various sites have reflected different emphases within the overall project objectives, making use of the possibilities offered by the different sites. The following summarises the various studies undertaken.

#### Republic of Ireland

After initial delays in obtaining permissions, this location provided the easiest physical access to subjects (members of the Garda Siochana). Mainly for this reason all of the experimental studies were conducted here. The work conducted has been as follows.

1. Analysis of over 50 terrorist and related incidents were undertaken, including 7 politically related armed robberies from 1977 to 1987. The initial analysis used police records, supplemented by contemporary newspaper reports. Focussing on the 7 politically-related armed robberies, and 11 non-political armed robberies for contrast, the following further analyses were undertaken:

- a. supplementary interviews with Police personnel
- b. 12 supplementary interviews with participants

The interviews explored and focussed on the availability of cue properties to participants (whether responded to or not). Through interviews and official records, incidents were reconstructed in as much detail as possible, and the participants perceptions and awareness of events were explored through discussion. This revealed that in all cases for the police participants a structure of the event consistent with an analysis in terms of situational cue control ie. what appear to be discriminative relationships can be discerned, at least with the benefit of hind sight. Participants were able to describe significant cue properties which had predictive properties related to the incident. Sometimes

these were acted upon, but more often they were noted but not acted upon. (This was referred to and discussed in the Final Report of Contract No. DAJA45-86-M-0458)

2. The incidents described in 1. were relatively complex. They often involved sequences of events occurring close together, associated with considerable tension and sometimes danger for the participants. To identify and emphasize more clearly relevant environmental qualities without the complicating factors of stress and speed of development, an effort was made to identify simpler situations suitable for experimental exploration. Examples of typical police activity (patrolling and vehicle check points), were chosen to both establish the utility of an analysis in terms of situational control and to experimentally explore further the nature of that control. These activities were chosen because they were routine, occurred frequently and were therefore well established elements in the behavioral repertoire of police officers. All the studies referred to below have involved the use of members of the Garda Siochana as subjects.

a. An initial exploration of the viability of conceptualising street patrolling in terms of situational control was undertaken. This involved accompanying officers on patrol, discussions with officers, plus discrete observation of patrolling activity. A limited form of functional analysis was conducted based upon observation of patrol activity, identifying relationships between police behaviour and features of the patrol environment.

b. Using information derived from a. above, an experimental study of a simulation of street patrolling was undertaken. The simulation was based on series of photographs, and allowed a form of free responding. This study drew on the functional analysis referred to in a. above for identifying salient environmental features, and also included length of service as a variable. This was published in Ryan and Taylor (1988). Differences between experienced and inexperienced officers were apparent in the use made of the stimulus material presented.

c. A replication of the above study in b. using different street patrol simulation material was undertaken, yielding similar results.

d. In an effort to return the study to the more complex real-life events like the armed robberies

referred to in 1. above, a simulation of events associated with 3 of armed robberies was attempted. This proved difficult to structure, in terms of generating appropriate simulation material (photographs), but was ultimately abandoned due to operational pressures on police participants resulting from a serious local incident. The limitations resulting from technical difficulties in attempting complex simulations with the equipment available became, however, very apparent.

e. As manpower conditions eased, it subsequently became possible to conduct a further simulation study, using residential burglary as a readily accessible, but more complex situation than patrolling. This study used experimental material in the form of slides from Taylor and Nee (1988) and could draw on the results of other work involving the Principal Investigator. This pictorial material was structured in terms of previously validated (Nee and Taylor, 1988) cue properties of various houses. In simulating choice of houses to burgle, the subject is able to explore visual aspects of the environment during the simulation, indicating appropriate decision points and responses. The performance of police officers on this task was compared with householders and convicted burglars serving prison sentences. For the purposes of this report, the significant question was the extent to which police officers by virtue of formal or informal training might be thought to share special 'expertise' in using environmental cues related to burglary with convicted burglars (previous work having established (Nee and Taylor, 1987; Taylor and Nee 1988) that burglars show differential sensitivity to situational cues) in contrast to householders. This reflects on the notion of special competencies and expertise in police work, albeit not directly related to terrorist threat (but one nevertheless involving discriminative relationships)

The results indicated that both experienced and inexperienced officers were less able to make use of appropriate cues than residential burglars, and performed in ways similar to ordinary householders. This does not necessarily indicate a lack of 'special expertise', of course, and it may be of interest to speculate that this may be an example of the importance of relevant context and structure in factors that control behaviour, rather than lack of expertise per se. The evidence which suggests that memory performance in experts is only superior to novices when the material to be remembered matches the experience of the individual may be relevant to our broader understanding of this (Egan and Schwartz, 1979; McKeithen et al., 1981; Gilhooly et al., 1988)

f. Although in one sense relatively simple, the simulation studies described above all have involved quite complex arrays of stimuli which are presented to the subject, which become even more complex in the free responding situations the simulations try to represent. An alternative task, the vehicle check point, was therefore developed, which was both more controllable and more linear in character than either the street patrol or the burglary (this was discussed at greater length in the Second Annual Report). To provide initial basic information on vehicle checks, an analysis of 361 'stops' at vehicle check points in and around Cork City were undertaken, through accompanying officers and both observing events and unobtrusive recording of police-public interactions. These were supplemented by a series of structured interviews with 32 police officers, and the administration of a simple questionnaire designed to identify critical features of decision making at Vehicle Check Points to a further 60 officers.

g. Based on the information yielded in f. a simulation study of vehicle check points was developed. This used the same photograph based simulation paradigm reported in Ryan and Taylor (1988), although the sequential nature of vehicle 'arrival' at the simulated check point reduced the sense in which this might be described as a free responding situation as in the earlier experiments. Four studies have been undertaken, where various cue qualities (presence or absence of visual cues like tax disks, number of occupants, etc.) and officer experience were critical variables. These studies were briefly outlined in the 1989 Annual Report. Differences have been revealed in the extent to which experienced, as opposed to inexperienced, officers are both differentially sensitive to, and make decisions, based on visual cues. The number and nature of photographs chosen in the simulation were significantly related to the presence of cues (derived from the earlier analysis of checks points). These choices revealed the decisions made by the officers (in terms of investigating further, or allowing the vehicle to proceed). Inexperienced officers, in contrast to experienced officers, made more informational demands (greater choice of slides) to make decisions.

### **General Comments**

This series of studies as a whole served to confirm the utility of the original analysis in terms of the importance of situational and discriminative control of police behaviour. To this extent, the studies have met the Technical Objectives for years 1, 2 and 3 concerning the systematic identification of environmental cue properties that might control the behaviour of security force personnel in practical

settings, and through the exploration of the nature of that discriminative control over behaviour. The extent to which police behaviour is controlled by visual cues is evidenced by the systematic relationships that have emerged between cue presence or absence in the various simulations and the behaviour of the police officer subjects. Furthermore, experience (interpreted as length of service) has been shown to be a factor in that control. Generally speaking, we might hypothesise that experienced officers are under greater discriminative control than inexperienced, in that experienced officers require and make less use of visual information in making decisions than inexperienced officers. All, however, show control over their behaviour by the cue properties identified in the studies.

Despite the initial explorations of politically related armed robberies, these simulation studies have not directly addressed the issue of discriminative control in life threatening settings or terrorist environments. The very nature of laboratory simulation, of course, even when grounded in practical settings, makes it unlikely that life threatening situations could be simulated with any degree of veracity and quite clearly, in some senses life threatening qualities may be significant issues when extending this analysis to terrorist environments. Some further reflections on this follow from the work undertaken in The Netherlands, and Northern Ireland reported below. The significance of stress or life threatening qualities in practical policing situations may be overstressed, however. Much police work in terrorist settings is essentially routine in character, even in circumstances where there may be a significant threat (this assertion is based on the Principal Investigators previous work, but see Taylor (1982) for some reflections on this issue).

#### The Netherlands

This location provided excellent access to both personnel and materials. The problems of language were readily overcome by the provision of two police officers to work on the project who could act as interpreters and assistants. The general background to this work is outlined in the two previous Annual Reports.

It was the intention to use this location to access European Terrorist incidents that might lend themselves to analysis in terms of discriminative cue control. As such it would therefore both complement and supplement the experimental and empirical work undertaken in the Republic of



Ireland and Northern Ireland. After discussions with the Deputy Head of the Centrale Recherche Informatiedienst and the Head of the Anti-terrorist Squad of Gemeentepolitie Amsterdam, one incident, rather than several, was chosen for analysis in detail. This concerned the events surrounding the arrest of Christof Wackernagel and Gert Schneider, members of the Rote Armee Fraktion, in November, 1977 (the 1989 Second Annual Report gives a brief account of the events in the incident). The study was conducted as follows.

- a. Preliminary discussions were undertaken with the assigned police assistants to establish the nature of the activity, and rehearse the procedures for conducting interviews. A structured interview format was developed which included methods of recording etc. Trial interviews about another incident with volunteer officers not involved in this incident were undertaken as both a rehearsal and check, with the Chief Investigator participating in these interviews.
- b. The study itself involved interviews with 8 of the 9 police participants in the incident (1 refused). The Chief Investigator participated in two of these interviews, and follow up repeat interviews were made with three of the participants to establish the accuracy and adequacy of the procedure.
- c. Visits were also made to the site to take photographs, etc.
- d. After the interviews, discussions were held with senior officers about that incident, the issues raised by it, and subsequent terrorist incidents in the Netherlands.
- e. In the course of the series of interviews, it emerged that Inspecteur Herman Van Hoogen, commander of the police detachment in the arrest of Wackernagel and Schneider, had formed a friendship with Wackernagel whilst the latter was in prison, which has continued after Wackernagel's controversial early release. This is something of a tangent, and has no bearing on the main thrust of the study. It does have, however, a certain interest beyond mere curiosity, and probably reflects on both the qualities of some of the terrorists who became involved in the Rote Armee Fraktion, and on Inspecteur Herman Van Hoogen. The matter has been followed up in some detail through further interviews with Inspecteur Van Hoogen and his wife, and will be the subject of a brief paper in the near future. An interview with Wackernagel was sought, and is still expected at

some future date.

### **General Comments**

The objective of this study was to establish in as much detail as possible the precise events which occurred during the arrest of Christof Wackernagel and Gert Schneider. As such, it was essentially a post hoc reconstruction of events. This in some ways limits the utility of the analysis; on the other hand, it is difficult to see how understanding of complex dangerous situations could ever be achieved in other ways.

Although this was a departure from the experimental studies undertaken in the Republic of Ireland, it yielded useful information. The discussion presented in the Second Annual Report which interprets the events in terms of rule following and contingency control offers a compelling account of the nature of the control over the behaviour of the police officers involved in this incident. The overwhelming impression is of increasingly close situational control over the actions of the various participants, where as tension and action developed, so behaviour becomes closely under discriminative control. As a retrospective study, it confirms and is consistent with the experimental work described above, but extends the analysis to a more complex and threatening situation. It therefore complements and broadens the analysis within the terms of the project objectives.

### Northern Ireland

The intention in developing the project in Northern Ireland was to firmly locate the analysis of discriminative control over the behaviour of security force personnel within a terrorist environment. This was to be achieved primarily through the analysis of incidents, supplemented by both field work and experiment. As the work developed, the hoped for experimental studies in Northern Ireland proved impossible to carry out, and the intention to parallel the simulation experiments conducted with the Garda Siochana with members of the R.U.C. had to be abandoned for both practical and operational reasons. Nevertheless, an active programme of analysis of terrorist related incidents has been completed, supplemented by observation of patrol work, etc. The nature and context of the incident analyses which are summarised in the following raise issues of sensitivity which will limit their dissemination.

Consistent with the emphasis in the experimental studies on routine police work, the study has

focussed on terrorist ambushes or bombings of security force personnel whilst on patrol duty. 84 cases of known terrorist ambushes or attempted ambush of members of the security forces have been identified and analysed. The events all took place in the Belfast or Armagh areas, in the period between 1984 to 1986. Suitable events were chosen for analysis by both searching through force incident files and discussions with local officers. This later process was inevitably informal, but served to reveal a range of successfully avoided ambushes not present in the official incident reports. Thus, not all the incidents analysed would appear in 'official' statistics. Where possible in such cases some further verification of the ambush intention was sought; the event was not included in the analysis where this was lacking.

Analyses of the incidents took the form of:

a. reconstruction of the incident from police files, including creating maps, etc., supplemented by discussions with local officers. Because some examples of ambushes successfully avoided were identified through discussion with officers, these incidents, especially if there were no casualties or official outcome, generally lacked a full file description or sometimes even any official record at all. In such cases, reconstruction took place from interviews;

b. supplemental information from interviews with participants for 60 of the incident;

c. discussions in local stations, visits to sites, plus accompanying local officers (not necessarily those involved in the particular incidents) on patrol in the areas involved to gain further local knowledge of precise sites, local context, etc.

### **General Discussion**

The ambush incidents referred to here differ from the Wackernagel and Schneider incident referred to above. They are generally of limited scope, referring to an actual or attempted bombing or shooting. They also invariably involved a measure of planning and organisation, sometimes at quite a sophisticated level. But because they are planned and selected, they imply a decision on the part of the terrorists to choose that location, etc. as opposed to others. It might be argued that they display the qualities of 'rationality' that have been found to characterise some criminal acts - notably

residential burglary. As such, they lend themselves to interpretation in terms of 'situational analysis' (Cornish and Clarke, 1986; Taylor, 1988).

This is an important point to emphasise, and one which directed one level of analysis of the results reported here. If correct, it contradicts the frequently asserted assumption that terrorist bombings and shootings are essentially random in character. In the incidents investigated here, certain features of almost all incidents recur - the role of cover, route of escape for the terrorist, vision of target, etc. This is particularly apparent from maps of incidents. The features of locations for the ambushes are not dissimilar to features used by burglars for the choice of houses for middle-range residential burglary, and presumably reflects both similar processes (the importance of discriminative cues) and similar kinds of cue values.

The analyses yielded a rich source of qualitative and quantitative information. The following basic information summaries the quantitative and qualitative features of the ambush incidents. Of the incidents, 69% could be clearly identified as planned, and 20% as opportunistic (the remainder could not be classified). This, however, is slightly misleading, for even within the opportunistic group, some measure of preparation was usually present (eg. availability of a weapon); these figures refer more to the fact that the site of the event appeared to be unplanned, as opposed to the event itself. 56% of the incidents were bombings of some form, and 45% shootings. Of the shootings, 70% took place at a distance. 50% of the bombing incidents were roadside bombs (bomb located in a culvert, etc.) and 35% were vehicle bombs.

In no cases were there specific prior intelligence warnings to the crews concerned, although they frequently occurred during periods of general warnings. In 68% of the incidents, some indication of abnormality at the site of the incident was apparent to the crews at the time, although these were either of a general kind (a suspicious package for example or a lack of pedestrian activity in a normally populated area). In those cases where it was possible to verify that an ambush was avoided (9% of the total), it was always the result of acting upon such a general indication. It is not possible to give any figure for non-verified avoidance of an ambush through acting on indications, nor is it possible to estimate the number of occasions when not acting did result in an ambush. Where ambushes were avoided, participants stressed the importance of viewing the particular situation they

encountered in the broader context of activity in the area. Officers almost invariably referred to the importance of knowledge of the area as the critical factor.

When the physical settings in which the incidents took place are examined, the overwhelming common feature of all incidents is the availability of escape for the terrorists, either by locating themselves away from the actual scene (63%) or having a clearly accessible avenue of escape from the incident (34%). Even where the terrorist is located away from the incident (as in a bombing with a command wire) escape routes also seem to be important determinants of position (along with unimpaired vision of the scene).

When the incidents are examined in detail, a number of general features are apparent.

1. Some attacks are wholly unpredictable. The well placed culvert bomb concealed under or alongside a road is essentially undetectable, and for in excess of 50% of the bombing incidents, (generally occurring in rural areas) there were no prior physical warning signs available. The opportunities for bombings of this kind are very high.
2. Aside from these situations, most relevant information available to the police officers concerned is visual in character, as viewed through the windows of a patrol vehicle; auditory information is rarely available.
3. In crews deployed in armored vehicles, the driver and observer are the only people who have opportunity to make an informed judgement on arrival at a location (due to lack of opportunity and restriction of vision for other crew members in the rear of the vehicle). Rear crew members often initially have only a hazy idea of the events they may become involved in, and indeed, may make little effort to make themselves aware of the environment outside of the vehicle.
4. In most incidents involving shootings, and in about one third of the bombing incidents, participants (driver or observer) were able when questioned to identify features of the environment that indicated risk that were present in the particular incident. Sometimes these were acted upon, but where they were not (in the majority of cases) two relevant factors can be identified that seem to

reduce the appreciation of risk:

- a. the incidence of previous hoax calls and prolonged periods of tension;
- b. lack of local knowledge as a basis for establishing what 'normal' situations looked like. As an example of the latter, a vehicle which subsequently explodes can be seen after the event to have been wrongly parked; in the absence of adequate local knowledge about local parking habits, particular car ownership, etc., it may not be possible to recognise this before the event.

5. In the accounts of officers involved in the incidents, it emerged that outside of very obvious threat (like a sighting of someone with a gun) the judgement concerning risk is not an absolute judgement, but one involving recognizing unusual or atypical circumstances, often at a mundane level, and in almost all cases was described as presupposing a sufficient knowledge base to make such a judgement possible.

6. There was no evidence in the analyses that experience (judged by length of service) related to capacity to either recognise threat, or act upon threat cues.

7. All of the incidents investigated have been viewed as having discrete temporal and physical boundaries, and indeed, our concerns here are with the particular bombing or shooting event, rather than any aftermath in terms of pursuit, etc. In fact, when an incident occurred, it rarely resulted in any follow up on the part of the personnel involved, as distinct from other patrols, etc.

It seems appropriate to conceptualise the bases of the behaviour of the security force personnel examined here in terms of discriminative control. The personnel act in relation to events as the impinge upon them; in the studies analysed here they are not in the main drawn into the series of reciprocal interactions with their attackers that might characterise more complex contingency control of a dynamically changing event. Furthermore, whilst we might want to characterise the general patrolling behaviour as occurring under stress, it does not occur under any special stress level, as presumably was the case in the unfolding of the incident in The Netherlands, where participants responded under fire.

Within the behavioural context in which this project has been carried out, the above relates

differential cue control to the extent of previous environmental learning that has taken place. This is of course broadly consistent with the findings concerning experience noted in the experimental studies referred to earlier, but adds the factor of local knowledge as a necessary base from which judgements can be made. Local knowledge emerges as the critical quality of discriminative control that contributes to successful threat awareness. Given that base, a list of specific potentially relevant cue features include easy escape from the scene for the terrorist, adequate cover (for both concealment and escape), and lack of distracting or complicating events (such as pedestrians in the area, or the presence of another police or army patrol in the area).

## 2. Conceptual Issues

In the Second Annual Report, an account of the conceptual bases of the project was given. Attention was drawn to the fact that the original project proposal was expressed in terms of discriminative control, referring to salient environmental events available to the police officers to predict the occurrence of a given incident. Emphasis was therefore placed on cues and cue clusters as the principle environmental qualities to focus on. Over the course of the investigations, however, it has become clear that this is not the essential issue involved. Rather, the fundamental concern which emerges from the work is the relationship between the control exercised by behavioural rules (with the implication of distant contingency relationships), the control exercised by the immediate environment in terms of contingency shaped and controlled behaviour (in which discriminative relationships are a critical element), and the inter-relationship between contingency shaped behaviour and rule governed behaviour.

In examining the complex security behaviours of concern here, a distinction can be made between explanations in terms of 'chains' of contingency relationships, and rule-governed relationships. The short-circuiting of experience referred to in the proposal for Contract DAJA45-86-M-0458 implicitly refers to the development of behavioural rules, but on reflection, it was inadequately conceptualized in the original proposal. In the Second Annual Report, it was noted that in terms of training initiatives related to the notion of 'experience' and 'short-circuiting of experience', the challenge lies not in addressing the creation of appropriate behavioural rules related to discriminative control by threat cues as such (identifying the bases of which may be a complex task), but in the more fundamental inter-relationship between rule-governed behaviour and situational

or contingency control.

It is worth briefly reiterating the discussion presented in the Second Annual Report about the nature of the discriminative control exercised by the situational cues which have been the subject of this project. The studies described here have established that systematic relationships do exist between cues and behaviour, in that identifiable environmental qualities appear to set the occasion for particular kinds of behaviour. This has been done experimentally, in the series of incident analyses, and the potential for this has been established in the observational analyses. The issue arises, however, as to whether such discriminative control is best characterised as an example of rule-governed behaviour, or contingency-shaped behaviour (Skinner, 1969). This is not simply an issue of terminology, nor an esoteric academic debate; Skinner uses the concept of rule-governed behaviour to related distant consequence to immediate behaviour, a distinctive and important feature of much of our more complex behaviour and one that might be thought to be of significance here.

Rule-governed behaviour has been described by Malott (1988) as "...a verbal description of a behavioural contingency...A behavioural contingency consists of a response, an outcome and a discriminative stimulus in the presence of which the response will produce the outcome". Contingency-shaped behaviour, in contrast, refers to a response having "...a given probability because the behaviour has been followed by a given kind of consequence in the past" (Skinner, 1969). Both rule-governed and contingency-shaped behaviour illustrate different processes of control over behaviour, although in any given situation, those differences may be difficult to discern (but see Catania et al. (1989) for a useful attempt to experimentally explore these issues). Additionally, both imply stimulus functions as part of the controlling contingencies. In the context of rule-following, such stimulus functions might be referred to (Schlinger and Blakely, 1987; Blakely and Schlinger, 1987) as Contingency-Specifying Stimuli (CSS) rather than simple discriminative stimuli. CSS may modify existing properties of simple discriminative stimuli either by establishing a new discriminative relationship between a stimulus and behaviour, or by altering a function of an existing discriminative stimulus. CSS are, therefore, discriminative stimuli with additional qualities. However, an important and critical point to note is that such qualities of CSS are not acquired through past correlation with reinforcement for any particular behaviour.



Skinner (1969) discusses the differences between rule-governed behaviour and contingency-shaped behaviour at some length. He particularly notes the point made earlier that one critical quality of rule-governed behaviour is that it serves to relate distant contingencies to immediate behaviour, serving to eliminate the need for experience of particular contingencies before appropriate responses can be made. This is of some significance for the analyses underlying this project, for a major conceptual difficulty for a behavioural analysis exploring the control over behaviour by terrorist threat is the relatively distant, nonspecific and infrequent consequences that might follow its realisation. Observation of the police officers involved in working in a terrorist environment, and the results of the incident analyses suggest that responding to terrorist threat is not simply a form of avoidance behaviour (as might be anticipated by narrowly focussing on responses to ambush, for example); rather, it involves much more complex forms of behaviour, sometimes showing evidence of reciprocal control by immediate contingencies or non-threat related rule-related contingencies, often without immediate or obvious consequences in terms of the threats faced, as well as sometimes relatively simple avoidance contingencies. Furthermore, many of the situations that might be encountered in terrorist environments are not necessarily threatening in themselves. They are essentially routine, and only become threatening in the presence of other events or circumstances. Indeed, in practical terms, this is one of the major difficulties for personnel working in potentially hostile environments of this kind. We have identified that a critical factor in this respect is local knowledge (which will be discussed later). All of this seems to support the notion that the discriminative functions primarily involved in the behaviours of concern to this project can be best characterised as those of CSS, rather than as a simple discriminative stimulus.

Another issue bearing upon the above discussion lies in analyses of the nature of experience in the work environments. In the original proposal for Contract Number DAJA45-86-M-0458, reference was made to field notes made in earlier work showing how some experienced officers were selectively more sensitive to threatening or incongruous circumstances. These observations formed the logic for the inclusion of analysis of experience as an element of this project. In some measure, the differences noted in the experimental studies between experienced and inexperienced officers sustains this suggestion, although it should be noted that these differences were not evident in the incident analyses in Northern Ireland. On the other hand, the emergence of the importance of local knowledge as a contextual variable in threat recognition in the Northern Ireland incidents might be

seen as identifying a more specific feature of the more general concept of experience. It is tempting to speculate on the nature of these differences however conceptualised in terms of some of the dichotomies used by Skinner (1969) to distinguish between rule-following and contingency-shaped behaviour: logical argument vs. intuition; conscious vs unconscious; knowing vs. knowing how.

In many ways, the issues discussed above could be located within a cognitive framework rather than within the explicitly behavioural framework adopted. Such a blurring of the distinctions between what at first sight might be thought to be irreconcilable perspectives is in fact a characteristic of the developing interest in the analysis of rule-governed behaviour. In a provocative paper discussing the relationship between cognitive and behavioural approaches to rule-governance, Reese (1989) draws our attention to the fruitful area of interplay that might develop between cognitive and behavioural psychologists in this area. Rules are necessarily inferences, and are not directly observable, but they do have objectively observable circumstances associated with them, and they do have objective consequences. The mix of procedures adopted in this project do seem to be sufficient to at least establish the viability and relevance of such an analysis of police behaviour in general, and in the particular terrorist environments examined. (A further issue related to this is discussed in Appendix 1).

### **3. Implications for Training and Overall Discussion**

The final year 3 objectives of the project include the following:

"2. develop from the experimental evidence available a systematic analysis of the features of the potential training initiatives;

3. the creation, and evaluation, of pilot learning packages embodying the knowledge gained in years two and three."

The intention underlying the original project proposal was to ultimately develop materials that would contribute to training members of the security forces who work in terrorist or terrorist like environments. This intention has continued to inform the project, although it has to be recognised that the original aspiration to develop and pilot learning materials (3. above) has not been met.

On reflection, these were probably overambitious objectives for two reasons:

- a. the practical difficulties in actually progressing the project (referred to in earlier Annual Reports) have limited in some measure the experimental elements of the project;
- b. more importantly, the conceptual refinement of the problem which has occurred as the project has developed has resulted in a much more complex frame of analysis than originally anticipated. Instead of identifying a set of generally applicable cue properties that might be amenable to rather instrumental training, the issue seems to revolve around the much more complex relationships that might obtain between rule following, contingency control and the extent of local knowledge of an area.

The concept of 'Local Knowledge' is worth briefly exploring. Local knowledge is some times equated with what in security work is referred to as 'low level intelligence'. However, what the officers interviewed in this study mean by local knowledge is something rather more than the collection of instrumental information about car ownership, householder activities, etc. It certainly does encompass that, but additionally involves some appreciation of the social processes that characterise the community; in a sense, the functional inter-relationships of that instrumental information. The original project proposal made certain implicit assumptions about this in the references to 'experience' (based on earlier field work), but quite clearly the relevant concept extends beyond aggregation of specific knowledge to a more general appreciation of functional relationships.

However, the contact that the patrolling police officer in a hostile environment has with these processes is rather unusual. In his work in that potentially hostile environment, such information that the officer has about events is largely visual. The patrolling police crews in the Northern Ireland incident analyses described here make judgements about a particular settings from within a vehicle which whilst offering some measure of protection, only allows visual access to the local environment (with radio contact with the broader context). The emphasis in the experimental studies described here on visual simulation seems, therefore, quite appropriate. Equally, the emphasis on visual discriminative qualities of the environment in the incident analyses is also appropriate. But as well as simply recognizing cue properties from the array of visual stimuli he is presented with, the effective officer in this situation has to locate his judgements in relation to the broader social processes of the setting he is in also from that visual information. This is an unusual situation to be in, and one that has rarely if ever received due acknowledgement in the training processes officers are exposed to.

(This general principle can be extended to other settings where security patrolling is involved, and presumably encompasses much of the activities that are generally regarded as more specifically military in character).

The activities of the officer in making judgements can be usefully conceptualised in terms of rule following, and we can draw on some of the explorations of teaching and amending rule following behaviour to inform our analysis (eg Poppen, 1989; Hayes et al. 1989). Provocative as they are however, we should note that these studies are in their early stages of development. It must also be noted that this project has not attempted to explore the issues involved in this. To do so would undoubtedly draw further together the behavioural and cognitive analyses referred to by Reese (1989), and might offer some rewarding reflections on areas developing further issues addressed here, such as behavioural knowledge acquisition processes in Artificial Intelligence and Expert System development. Another important issue beyond the scope of this project but perhaps related to any operational solution to the problems of patrolling in hostile environments is the extent to which either local or distant decision aids of some form might assist the patrol officer, or at least supplement the information available to him or his supervisor. This raises the further question of the appropriate structure for the collection, recording and organisation of low level intelligence.

Whilst the experimental studies in the Republic of Ireland and the analysis of the RAF incident in The Netherlands can tell us something about the processes of discriminative control over police behaviour, the Northern Ireland incident analyses tell us about the instrumental features of the environment that the officer can be taught to recognise, and be alert to. These instrumental features might be regarded as relating to 'opportunities' for a terrorist attack to take place. 'Opportunity' used in this sense is a concept derived from the general framework of the rational choice perspective (Cornish and Clarke, 1986; Taylor, 1988. See also Leites and Walsh 1970; Denardo, 1984; Mason, 1984), a view on the nature of deviant activity which has informed conceptual issues in this project..

We can make some useful contextual comments about opportunities for terrorist behaviour from the Rational Choice perspective. In the context of concern to us, perhaps the most important initial point to make is that whilst opportunity may be a necessary prerequisite of a terrorist attack, opportunity cannot be equated with terrorist motivation. Thus our understanding of the opportunities for terrorist

attack may tell us little about the broader rationale of terrorist activity. However, if we note the comments made by Crenshaw (1988) about the changes in the relative balance between instrumental and organisational pressures for action as a terrorist organisation develops, we may see the notion of opportunity assuming a more important role as pressures towards organisational determinants of action grow. This may well characterise the Provisional I.R.A., the principal terrorist group involved in the incident analyses discussed here. In terms of developing psychological and behavioural theories of terrorism, this may be an issue worth further exploration

The principle features of opportunity for terrorist attack which has emerged from the incident analyses undertaken in this project has been the availability of escape for the terrorist, associated with cover for observation. The various attacks take place in a multitude of situations. But excluding those for which no possible warning could be discerned (largely rural culvert bombs), we can identify corners, or areas where there is distant visual access as the predominant locations. In environments like Northern Ireland (both urban and rural) the number of opportunities for attack are obviously very high. It would be unrealistic to imagine that even with sensitivity to appropriate cues, all possible opportunities for attack could be recognised. The factor of local knowledge is relevant here, however. Prediction of risk, as we have already noted, is related both to sensitivity to cues and the functional context in which those cues occur.

If we were to characterise the cue elements related to opportunity for terrorist attack that might be focussed on for training, therefore, they would be largely geographical or topographical in character, drawing on physical relationships between buildings and street layouts.

These are associated with the following factors related to **risk** :

cover, inappropriate presence, proximity or absence of pedestrians or other civilians, distance from the road or location of security force personnel, house occupancy (in the case of hostage related attacks), proximity of other security force patrols, and ease of escape routes and rear access from the area.

In addition, a factor related to **ease** of attack can also be identified:

absence (or otherwise) of simple precautions on the part of police personnel (this refers principally to positioning of vehicles to enable safe exit from vehicle, exit from road or building areas, etc., or the use of available cover by personnel once out of the vehicle).

These results, therefore, point the way towards the development of systematic training strategies to prepare personnel for work in hostile terrorist environments. The proposition that specific cues can be identified that are associated with risk of terrorist attack has been sustained in some measure, and the nature and qualities of these cues have been discussed within both a theoretical and practical context. The most important unresolved issue to emerge related to the utility of the approach has been the importance of a functional local knowledge of the working area from which the discriminative features identified gain their significance. The project, therefore, leaves unexplored the issue of ways of defining and representing local knowledge or low level intelligence as an additional element to the analysis of discriminative cues.

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#### Appendix 1

The following is an extract (Chapter 4) from a book entitled **Fanatical Political Violence: A Behavioural Approach** which will be published (Brassey-Pergamon) in January, 1991. It is included as an Appendix to this report because much of the conceptual thinking underpinning this chapter (and indeed the book as a whole) was assisted by work on this project. The contribution made to the work by the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioural and Social Sciences is fully acknowledged in the work.

Whilst initially considering the concept of ideology in general psychological terms, this Chapter then discusses the relationship between Ideology and Rule-governed behaviour. As such, it represents a more general application of the notion of rule-governance in the control of behaviour.

#### Chapter 4

##### Political Behaviour and its Ideological Context

A distinctive quality of the behaviour of the politically committed, whether we term it fanatical or otherwise, is that it is highly organised and directed towards particular ends. There is a simple way of illustrating this. The political activist can usually describe specific objectives which he is aiming towards, and furthermore, can relate current behaviours to those objectives. For the political activist, those objectives might be characterised as ideology, and the extent to which an individual's behaviour closely follows ideological prescriptions may be one element of what we mean by political fanaticism. Ideology, as we will see, provides the situation, as well as content, of political behaviour. It is worth noting that we might also characterise the religious enthusiast in the same way.

In contrast to the ideologically committed, generally speaking the non-activist lacks in any personal sense the explicit capacity to describe overall embracing aims of behaviour that characterises political views. Even in those limited circumstances where we can express overall objectives that matter to us, they are often disorganised and may well be mutually contradictory. The individual who has a distinct and compelling enthusiasm (we might even refer to fanatical enthusiasm) for soccer or music, for example, is an example of this 'partial' ability to describe objectives. But such people lack the all embracing directive qualities we associate with committed political or religious behaviour.

The characteristic organisation of political behaviour of the politically committed may be apparent in two ways, one focussing on the context in which politics takes place, and the other on psychological qualities. Firstly, viewing political behaviour in terms of its context, we see that it invariably takes place within some kind of structured and organised arena; a parliament or legislature of some kind, a smoked filled room of a party caucus, or the discussions of a terrorist group identifying the choice of a target. This context both refines and supports political behaviour by facilitating the emergence of analyses of current circumstances and providing immediate subsidiary objectives for the activist to achieve.

In this sense, because the structured context creates a forum of some form for meeting others, political behaviour seems

to be also essentially a form of group behaviour, the groups varying in size and function depending on the nature of the political activity involved. These groups (like all groups) command loyalty, give structure to the participants, and provide support and direction. As a result of this, individual actions of those involved are influenced by a complex sequence of reciprocal social influences, mutually selecting and reinforcing appropriate behaviour. It is these influences that we call group processes. These processes may well be important elements in the determination of political behaviour, (we encountered some of them in Chapter 3), but we must also note that these processes are in themselves insufficient to account for the complex qualities of political behaviour. This is especially so where it impinges on fanatical behaviour. Group forces may well contribute to the processes that shape and direct fanatical political behaviour, but do not seem to be a sufficient account of the direction of that behaviour, and more particularly, of its overall organisation and coherence over extended periods of time.

A critical feature of our experience of political behaviour is the degree of generality we see in its expression. Politically active individuals seem to share common political activities, or perhaps more appropriately, they behave in similar ways, which seem appropriate to and consistent with generalisations we can make about overall political frameworks. The ubiquity of membership of political parties, for example, illustrates the extent to which commonality in political behaviour can be found. The degree of intensity of expression of behaviour, or the particular choices that an individual might make within a framework such as a political party may well vary. In recognising such relative contextual conformity, we generally describe the bases of such behaviour by reference to the notion of Ideology.

We noted earlier that the structural qualities of political activity seem insufficient to explain the temporal organisation of political behaviour. On the other hand, the second quality of the organisation of political behaviour, the psychological qualities of Ideology do seem to fulfill that role. We will discuss this at length below. Our concern in this chapter, therefore, will be with developing an understanding of the organisation of political behaviour through the psychological qualities of the concept of ideology. In doing this, we will retain and eventually return to our ultimate concern with extreme political violence and fanaticism. The argument will assume that what we refer to as ideology provides the basis on which the structure and direction political behaviour develops, and from which in turn violent political behaviour may grow. Ideology is the means by which political behaviour acquires both meaning and also legitimacy. We will in this Chapter, therefore, initially discuss the concept of ideology in general, developing the behavioural perspective introduced in Chapter 1. Later we will extend the discussion to our specific concern with violent political behaviour towards the end of this Chapter, and in Chapters 5 and 6. To anticipate later discussions, we will consider issues related to both the content of ideology (in terms of militancy and messianism) and the process of ideology (in terms of imminence and lack of public space).

The discussion presented here will necessarily gloss over many points which a more detailed analysis would consider. Furthermore, by adopting a behavioural perspective, issues of concern from other perspectives will not necessarily be given due weight, at least in their own terms. As a review of psychological approaches to ideology (or as a related account of the influence of ideology on psychology) it will therefore appear to be lacking. The area generally referred to as Political Psychology, with its emphasis on phenomenology and psychodynamic explanation, will certainly not receive the due weight its proponents might consider appropriate. On the other hand, the behavioural emphasis developed here complements that adopted in other chapters, providing a basis on which later discussion of the relationship between ideology and fanatical political behaviour can be developed. We should also note that our focus is essentially on the influence of political commitment on an individual which results in fanatical political violence. Our

analysis may also prove to be an element in understanding less extreme political behaviour, but our intention here is not to present an overall account of the influence of political thought on behaviour. Billig et al.<sup>1</sup> offer interesting reflections on this more general issue, which are not entirely inconsistent with those developed here, although they draw on different conceptual perspectives.

### Perspectives on Ideology

Ideology is a difficult concept to examine in behavioural terms. The Greek origin of the term relates it to 'ideas', not behaviour, and a contemporary dictionary definition<sup>2</sup> gives an archaic meaning to the term 'ideology' as the Science of Ideas. Current usage of the term 'ideology' seems to have its origins in the nineteenth century post-revolutionary French political movement, the Ideologues. Early, if not initial, use of the term itself has been attributed to Antoine Destutt de Tracy<sup>3</sup>. In original use, it described the particular qualities of the study of ideas developed by the Ideologues. Their principal concern was with how the individual combined sense impressions into beliefs, an undertaking which in its time was challenging to orthodox (and largely religious) views about the nature of belief. In many ways, the Ideologues anticipated many aspects of contemporary psychology, although they are rarely credited with such influence in accounts of the historical development of psychology<sup>4</sup>.

Conventional psychological definitions of ideology reflect these origins, but generally do not make reference to ideas as such, but to more specific but related inner states such as beliefs and attitudes. Rokeach<sup>5</sup> illustrates this in his definition of ideology, which is also typical of how other authors have approached this issue. "...an ideology is an organisation of beliefs and attitudes - religious, political or philosophical in nature - that is more or less institutionalised or shared with others, deriving from external authority..."<sup>6</sup>. Whilst this definition may not particularly offer a behavioural perspective, and indeed offers no views on the relationship between beliefs and attitudes and political behaviour, it nevertheless does include a number of features which are worth drawing attention to, and which will progress our discussion.

The first point to note is that ideology in the sense used by Rokeach, refers not just to politics, but to other forms of activity as well. In Rokeach's definition, ideology refers to the framework in which various kinds of behaviour take place, and from which we can understand that behaviour, rather than any particular kind of behaviour as such. In this sense, ideology describes a process or context, expressed perhaps as a particular set of concepts or rules from which our actions are developed. In these terms, we can therefore reasonably talk about religious ideology as much as we can refer to political ideology. Both refer to the framework that provides overall structure and direction to behaviour, and which sets in motion particular kinds of choices of activity. For the religious, of course, this may seem to be a strange use of words, for they are probably more accustomed to talk about 'faith' or dogma, rather than ideology. Nevertheless, whilst we typically find ideology used only within a political context, it seems reasonable in these terms to extend its usage beyond politics to other areas.

The second point we might note from Rokeach's definition is that the concept of ideology has a quality of sharing associated with it. Other people also 'subscribe' to an ideology, and ideology takes its meaning from some form of public statement of its principles. This in turn implies that ideologies have a structure that can be articulated, and because of this, can be judged in terms of internal consistency. This may be what Rokeach means by referring to 'institutionalised'. The reference to '...derived from external authority...' further emphasises the formality of expression we associate with ideology, as well as indicating one potential source of legitimacy for ideological views. That formality

derives in the main from the communicative and essentially written nature of ideology. Because ideology is public (at least to initiates) and articulated in some way, it can therefore also be subject to logical analysis. Indeed, its public and articulated nature may well serve to emphasise the importance of consistency, refining and developing its expression.

This raises an interesting issue. Whilst in Rokeach's view, ideology is expressed in psychological terms as beliefs and attitudes, the origins of the particular qualities of ideology lie not in the internal processes of the individual, but in the external expression of precepts by some authority from which the individual might derive attitudes. Attitudes and beliefs, therefore, are only hypothesised mediating structures, rather than determinants of ideology as such. This effectively inverts the relationship we might assume. We will note in our later discussion the extent to which many authors, whilst accepting Rokeach's general definition of ideology, fail to recognise its implications in this respect. They persist in seeking inner causes to ideology as expressions of psychological qualities, rather than recognising the essential external quality of the content of ideology as it might control or influence behaviour. The importance of the written nature of ideology cannot be understated, and this of course gives us some appreciation of how the written word can wield such power.

However, our concern with ideology is not because it offers a way of organising beliefs and attitudes, in the terms used by Rokeach. Our principal concern here is with behaviour, and our interest in ideology arises from a concern with political behaviour rather than attitudes. We might, therefore, both anticipate our later discussion and summarise our concerns with ideology by developing Rokeach's definition referred to above and extending it in a behavioural framework. In this sense, we might view ideology as a common, public and broadly agreed set of externally derived rules which influences an individual and which help to regulate and determine behaviour, giving it consistency with past action, and helping to generate appropriate behaviour in novel environments. We should note that we may be using 'rules' in a slightly unusual sense here, and we will return to this issue later.

Further exploration of the concept of ideology will help us refine the extent to which we can make use of it in the explanation of political behaviour. It will also enable us to place into broader perspective issues which relate to the concept of political behaviour. At the outset, we should note that when we look at ideology, and try to identify the attributes of a particular ideological position, we are not, of course, undertaking a psychological or behavioural analysis. Rokeach's emphasis on the external origins of ideology emphasises this. Analyses of ideology are literary and essentially political undertakings, looking at peoples actions in political forums of some kind from a political perspective, and trying to place order on their activities from that perspective. Ideological analysis is therefore not so much concerned with the individual, and his political actions in this sense, but the activity of groups of people doing political things. Thus, concepts like left wing or right wing may be used to summarise particular clusters of attributes - political views based on Marxist writings, for example perhaps attracting the term left wing. Other kinds of concepts may be used in particular settings - imperialists and freedom fighters seem to be examples of terms that describe particular clusters of attributes related to the nature of government in particular areas. The important point to note is that these essentially political terms do not necessarily imply parallel psychological explanations.

Because ideology is something which is expressed, and seems to generally have an origin with a particular authority, it can be assessed in terms of its logic and internal consistency. Ideological principles can be identified, for example from Marxist views, that might guide the adherent in broadly consistent ways, specifying his actions in logical and predictable terms. Ideology, therefore, sets out a series of broad propositions (referred to above as rules), and offers an analysis that an individual can subscribe to. In subscribing to an ideology, the individual has a means of working out

consistent responses to circumstances, either by application of the particular principles, or by reference to authority. A 'scientific analysis' from a Marxist perspective of a social problem would indicate the former, reference to the Bible or Mein Kampf for guidance on some problem might illustrate the latter. In behavioural terms, we would refer to the influence ideology has over an individual as being 'controlled by an ideology'. We can see in the above, therefore, that ideology can serve to either create the behavioural 'rules' referred to in our earlier development of Rokeach's definition of ideology, or to contribute to the conditions that enable those 'rules' to be expressed.

Ideology serves to link people together along a common dimension. It is presumably perfectly possible to have a single subscriber to an ideological position, but generally we restrain our usage to the collective expression of particular views. Perhaps because of this, ideological statements appear general and address broad issues. Particular ideological statements might from time to time arise, an example of which might be 'do not eat South African fruit'. But ideology in the sense used here does not particularly concern itself with the agricultural practices in South Africa. Rather the purchase of South African fruit is an element of some broader strategy to both demonstrate opposition to the South African regime, and perhaps to inflict on the country some kind of economic disadvantage. The ideological logic is expressed at a much more general level than the particular behaviour that might from time to time be derived from it.

Ideology is also something that may serve as a framework to link together particular kinds of people. Geographically or racially based ideology might be termed nationalism and uses, as its principle attribute of both membership and concern, reference to that geographical or racial grouping. Ideology might also link together, however, more conceptually defined groups; religious ideology, for example, addresses a very broad spectrum of people - the believers in a particular religion. In a further and more constrained example, we can see that members of a particular socio-economic group might be the focus of class based ideology. Sometimes ideology can focus on several such groupings, linking together otherwise diverse groups - class based religious ideology would be one example of this. In this sense, therefore, ideology defines a group to which the member can belong. It might be an ill defined conceptual group, like the member of a class, or it might be a very particular physical group, like membership of a church or club, that regularly meets and provides a focus for social activity.

Another quality of ideology we can identify is that it offers guidance about how to respond to things that the individual has no experience of, and perhaps no control over. The public finances of a State are something over which an individual citizen in the main has relatively little control. For most wage earners, the redistribution of wealth, for example, is something which that individual can do little about at a personal level. Most wage earners are unlikely to be in positions to generate new wealth, and in any event they can do little to effect direct change. A particular ideology (like Marxism) offers the individual a means of coming to terms with and understanding differences in the distribution of wealth, and gives direction to action, perhaps in concert with others, to effect change. In this sense, ideology provides the individual with a 'ready made' set of responses to particular novel situations, which will be both generally consistent with things he might have done in the past or will do in the future, and with others who share these concerns however they have arisen. In the terms we have used earlier, this is another example of ideology as the development of behavioural rules, and it illustrates the sense in which behaviour is controlled by ideology. By acting in concert with others, the individual can of course often exert influence not possible when acting on his own. This is perhaps a further important factor in understanding the attractions and influence political ideology might have over the individual's behaviour.

A number of authors have noted the importance of ideology for the individual when faced with lack of certainty. Religions illustrate perhaps best of all the extent to which such uncertainty can influence the extent to which ideology can determine behaviour. Religious doctrine is invariably based upon assertions of truth related to authority. A religion may be based on God's word, but God in general is not available to help deal with the numerous small issues that the devotee may need guidance on. His Word, therefore, needs to be mediated in some way, and furthermore, such mediation needs to be available to consult and refer to. This is often achieved by a prophet, or prophets, who mediate between God and the devout, and produce written statements of ideology to guide the faithful. The Torah, the Bible and the Qur'an are obvious examples.

God is, however, not directly available to the faithful, and the adequacy and nature of His ideological guidance must inevitably attract some measure of uncertainty, especially if that guidance (expressed in holy writings) was written a long time ago, as is the case with most contemporary religious authorities of this kind. There is some evidence that the strength with which an individual subscribes to an ideology, at least within a religious context, is in some circumstances paradoxically inversely related to the degree of certainty he might have in the authoritative bases of that ideology. In an interesting and important study of the effects of failure of religious prophecy, Festinger et al.<sup>7</sup> described a religious sect which gathered around a particular prophet who foresaw the end of the world. After predicting the final day and time, the sect prepared itself; but at the final hour, nothing happened, and the prediction failed. This challenge to the ideological credibility of the prophet and the sect resulted for some members in dissolution and withdrawal from the group. But for the majority, after a brief period, they became even more ardent members of the sect. They moved from being essentially inward looking (they saw themselves as the possessors of special and divine knowledge not available to others, a chosen few), to actively proselytizing their faith amongst others, seeking expansion of the sect through conversions. We might speculate about the influence of psychological traps, and other social psychological processes, in the development of this.

There is, therefore, a complex relationship between ideology and certainty, which presumably also has a bearing on the relationship between ideology and behaviour. Ideology seems to provide us with ready made solutions to problems; it specifies choices for us, and offers a structure to enable us to understand the events in our environment over which we have no experience or control. In the terms introduced earlier, we can, therefore, describe ideology as behavioural 'rules'. We can also describe behaviour as 'controlled' by ideology. Our adherence to a particular ideological position, however, does not necessarily seem directly related to utility, at least in the sense of ideology successfully predicting outcomes (as in the case of Festinger's religious group described above for example). Of course, there is one sense in which ideology by definition has utility. Whether or not the framework offered by an ideology is 'correct' in any objective sense, simply by virtue of providing a framework to guide behaviour it is successful. In this sense it reduces uncertainty, and perhaps enables the individual to evaluate the relative merits of environmental events as they impinge on him.

Reduction in uncertainty may be a very powerful force motivating the acceptance and adherence to an ideology. We all from time to time experience social anxiety, or doubt the direction our lives are taking. Because ideologies of the kind we are discussing offer a sense of certainty, as well as a clear structure within which the individual can order their lives, it is not surprising that adherence to an ideology offers for the insecure individual many attractions. This is not to suggest that adherents to an ideology are insecure or anxious. Rather, it is simply to note that the sense of certainty and security that an ideology can offer, as well as the broader supportive context in which ideologically controlled behaviour might develop, has many attractions.



We are more accustomed to look at the development of security as a childhood phenomena, as a feature of child rearing practises. But the features of early learning that determine childhood insecurity are equally apparent and operative in adult life. In this sense, the social and cognitive structure that an ideology can give an individual may be an important determinant not only of the extent of ideological control over behaviour, but also of the forces attracting an individual to that ideology in the first place. The sense of 'conversion' which might characterise acceptance of an ideology may well be related to this.

#### Psychological Approaches to Political Ideology

There are always difficulties in using concepts from one discipline to set the agenda for analyses in other disciplines employing different conceptual systems. No more than in other areas, this has proved to be a problem in psychological approaches to understanding political ideology. Psychological studies addressing this problem, as distinct from the behavioural approach adopted here, can be described under two broad headings: those that have primarily taken ideological and political concepts as a starting point, and tried to identify psychological correlates of those concepts; and those that have started from primarily a psychological position, and tried to relate psychological concepts to political ideological activity. The former we will characterise as the Political Starting Point, the latter as the Psychological Starting Point. As we review these approaches below, we should note that the two starting points do not necessarily define mutually exclusive areas.

##### 1. The Political Starting Point

One striking feature of political activity is the difference in political positions that can be characterised by the left and right, or liberal and conservative. Indeed, it is sometimes claimed that this is a universal feature of political organisation, reflecting underlying fundamental social and political processes. Certainly, experience in the Western democracies suggests that political activity is broadly ordered along a continuum describing a conservative-liberal dimension. What might be termed left wing or liberal views have a consistency and overall logic to them, as do what might be termed right wing or conservative views. Contemporary left wing views generally relate to things like replacement of national spending on armaments with spending on social services, public provision of health care and education, and social and racial integration. Contemporary right wing views generally relate to polar opposites of these; reductions in State spending, and reduction in taxes, provision of a military potential, and greater encouragement of individual provision for welfare rather than public provision. We should note, however, that these views may well be related to particular historical and social conditions, and therefore what particular issues might be viewed as characterising the left wing, for example, may be a relative judgement which changes over time.

Yet even though left and right may be dependent on, and related to social and historical conditions, the degree of consistency which both clusters of views show has led some authors to explore the extent to which such a left-right dichotomy reflects important personal and psychological qualities of people. The consistency of left-right is of course most obviously evident where political parties are organised in terms of left-right views. But it can also be discerned in political systems where political groupings are not ordered along that dimension. In the U.S.A., for example, the major political parties are relatively loose coalitions of a variety of political positions. Yet within these coalitions, left and right wing elements can be identified of both Democratic and Republican parties.

One notable exploration of this approach can be found in the work of Hans Eysenck<sup>8</sup>. He devised a psychometric scale



to measure liberal and conservative attitudes, which in his view broadly corresponded to the left-right dichotomy. The scale uses statements with which the respondent either agrees or disagrees - the nature of the answers given are then used to construct a score which locates an individual on a radical-conservative dimension. The kinds of issues addressed by Eysenck's scale can be seen in the type of questions asked. 'Our treatment of criminals is too harsh; we should try to cure them, not punish them', and 'Ultimately, private property should be abolished and complete socialism introduced', are examples of questions where agreement indicates a radical position. 'Production and trade should be free from government interference' and "My country right or wrong" is a saying which expresses a fundamentally desirable attitude' are questions where agreement indicates a conservative or right wing perspective. Eysenck assumes that attitudes, as expressed by agreement or disagreement with the kind of questions above, cluster around particular positions. These positions we describe as radical or conservative. "...to say that a person is a Socialist or a Conservative immediately suggests that he holds not just one particular opinion on one particular issue, but rather that his views and opinions on a large number of different issues will form a definite pattern..."<sup>9</sup>.

To be useful in understanding political or ideological behaviour, Eysenck's approach must assume a correspondence in some sense between attitude and behaviour, something which is by no means certain or established. A more fundamental difficulty for this approach, however, is the extent to which an individual's views may be inconsistent, and not cluster in the way that Eysenck assumes. Consistency in a political sense may not necessarily equate with consistency in this psychological context. It seems perfectly possible, for example, for someone to hold both left and right wing views as defined by Eysenck, about different issues. An individual may, for example, be all in favour of socialised medicine, and a strong supporter of State intervention in industry and commerce. He may also be an ardent racist, desiring segregation and discrimination of people on the basis of colour. The views are inconsistent only if the political bases of fundamental assumptions about the psychological radical/conservative dimension are accurate.

These difficulties can in some measure be overcome if other attributes of the radical/conservative dimension are identified. One approach has been to look for more fundamental psychological qualities that perhaps underpin this dimension, such as, for example, receptivity to change in social and political organisation. Bird <sup>10</sup> proposed this for example, and in terms of the contemporary political scene, such an approach seems to have some relevance. Difficulties again emerge, however, over peoples capacities to hold inconsistent views, and the fact that changes have occurred to both left and right wing ideologies over time. Agreement with general principles about womens suffrage, for example, would hardly generate the passions they once did, and would probably now be encompassed within most contemporary right wing ideologies. Yet during the 1920's at the height of the suffragette movement, views on womens suffrage would probably have been one of the attributes used to distinguish radicals from conservative.

An alternative approach to this problem has been developed by Silvan Tomkins <sup>11</sup>, who has characterised political activity of the right and left in terms of the ways in which people use information, and the ways in which they solve problems. He relates these to people values, and uses the terms Humanistic ideologies to characterise broadly left wing ideology, and Normative to characterise broadly right wing ideology. The use of normative and humanistic as opposites along a psychological dimension of some form, which also characterises Eysenck's approach, is retained by Tomkins. The humanistic/normative dimension can be illustrated by reference to a number of issues which discriminate between them. "Man is an end in himself" (left wing and humanistic) contrasts with "...the valuable exists independent of man" (right wing and normative); "values are what man wishes" (left wing and humanistic) in contrast to "values exist independent of man" (right wing and normative); "man should satisfy and maximise his drives and affects" (left wing

and humanistic) in contrast to "man should be governed by norms which in turn modulate his drives and affects" (right wing and normative).

Tomkins, therefore, distinguishes between the right and left in terms of their underlying values. He suggest that humanistic (and left wing) dimensions emphasise a persons wants and experiences; normative (right wing) dimensions emphasise norms, rules and modes of action. Using these assumptions, more general efforts have been made to relate these dimensions to personal qualities of individuals, expressed in terms of personality <sup>12</sup>.

Tomkins offers a more complex and sophisticated set of attributes on which judgements and categorising of ideology might be made than other authors, but it is difficult to see how it escapes from the same sort of criticisms leveled at the earlier approaches. The persistent series of sex scandals, for example, that seem to emerge around politicians of both the left and right from time to time suggest that normative pressures are not always sufficient to temper what Tomkins would call other humanistic pressures! More seriously, it offers few insights into the ways in which left wing groups (reflecting humanistic ideologies) can in the context of extreme radical views, demand of their adherents an extreme degree of obedience and conformity to rules, a characteristic of right wing (and normative) attributes. The high degree of conformity demanded by extreme left wing terrorist groups has been termed 'the paradox of conforming antiauthoritarians' by Post <sup>13</sup>. It is a very evident feature of radical terrorist groups such as the Provisional I.R.A., which demands obedience of members and followers, and inflicts on recalcitrants gross punishments which in other contexts would be termed the barbaric attributes of right wing repression.

A further problem of all these approaches is that they often seem to represent a 'leakage' of the authors own political values into the presumed 'objective' psychological categories used. Perhaps this is inevitable if the starting points are political, rather than psychological, categories. Tomkin's views on Normative and Humanistic values, for example, seem to be almost caricatures of the liberal-conservative dichotomies that characterised social movements in the 1960's. They may be argued to encapsulate fundamental qualities, but those qualities look decidedly dated and very much based on social context when viewed with hindsight. Adorno's work on authoritarianism <sup>14</sup> referred to in Chapter 3 and noted below similarly seems to draw on a caricature of the archetypal Nazi, and may well reflect more on post-war sentiment rather than on psychological reality.

In general, we can conclude that attempts to develop from a political and ideological starting point relevant psychological dimensions seems to have limited utility. Perhaps the difficulty lies in assuming that what makes sense from the perspective of establishing conceptual clarity and uniformity for political and ideological concepts also makes sense in psychological terms. A major weakness seems to be the extent to which people's behaviour, and indeed attitudes as well, do not consistently conform to assumed generalised ideological and political prescriptions.

## 2. The Psychological Starting Point

In contrast to those discussed above, psychological starting points to the analysis of ideology have generally attempted to relate psychological qualities as states in some sense more fundamental than socially determined ephemera, to features of ideology. Typically, they have tended to focus on the relationship between political activity and personality, assuming personality to be a fundamental psychological quality of people. Personality has been defined as "...the combination of relatively enduring characteristics of an individual that are expressed in a variety of situations" <sup>15</sup>. This

approach to ideology therefore focuses on the role of relatively stable internal qualities of individuals, expressed as personality, and relates these to forms of political expression.

As a matter of common observation, we might note that on the whole an individual's behaviour is relatively predictable and organised. Personality theorists assume that such stability and organisation is the result of particular qualities of the individual, often termed personality traits. These qualities may be related to and modified by situational and environment factors, but in the main are assumed to be invariant and in some way constitute attributes of that person. Such attributes may be inherited, or they may have their origins in the interaction of inherent propensities with significant events, usually (but not necessarily) in early childhood.

Most approaches to ideology from this perspective have emphasised psychodynamic approaches to personality derived from the work of Freud, and have especially emphasised the role of the unconscious. Typical of these approaches is Davies <sup>16</sup>. He asserts that in his view "...the most fundamental contribution to political psychology was made by Freud..." and he goes on to discuss the origins of political behaviour, including the role of ideology, in psychodynamic terms. Consistent with Freudian theories, these approaches tend to interpret fundamental qualities of political activity as a form of disguised, unconscious and unfulfilled, psychosexual aspiration and adjustment. Davies account of political development <sup>17</sup> is expressed in these terms, and he develops themes which have been introduced by other authors, such as Lasswell <sup>18</sup>. Lasswell in fact related his theory more directly to political activists, and developed the notion of three political 'types': the Agitator, the Administrator and the Theorist. Lasswell related these types to Freudian psychodynamic theory, in terms of sexual repression and its relationship with power. However, Lasswell, (and most other theorists in this mould) fail to relate these rather general assertions and interpretations to the specifics of ideology as we know them, and in particular, the left-right dimension that, however elusive it may be, seems to be so prominent a feature of actual political behaviour.

Psychodynamic explanations certainly accord well with literary analyses and pretensions, and psychodynamic accounts in consequence frequently inform fictional and biographic accounts of political events, or political figures. The main themes they emphasise in analyses of ideology is the role of sexual repression, and its relationship with power. Thus, the political activist in some sense resolves his particular developmental psychosexual problems by becoming involved in political activity. That political behaviour, and the ideologies that seem to inform it, are concerned with the regulation of power, and control over others in some sense, cannot be disputed. Whether psychodynamic explanations represent a useful contribution to understanding political behaviour, however, is a much more difficult judgement to make. Looking at psychology as a whole, it is rather surprising that this area should be so dependent on Freudian speculation, given the limited role that Freudian accounts play in other areas of psychological analysis. Perhaps this is related to the very evident lack of conceptual development in the area of political psychology, and the paucity of empirical research.

An approach which has elements in common with the psychodynamic theories noted above can be seen in the attempts that have been made to relate presumed fundamental personality attributes like Authoritarianism to particular ideological positions. Concepts like authoritarianism have a more coherent empirical base than most psychodynamic constructs, and to some extent lie outside of the Freudian framework. They are also, however, amenable to psychodynamic interpretation. As we have noted earlier, the origins of work on authoritarianism lay in attempts by a number of workers to try to understand some of the psychological bases of the events which characterised political life in Nazi Germany. A group of workers, led by Adorno <sup>19</sup> described what they termed the authoritarian personality, which they

associated with right wing fascist political views. In their view, the authoritarian tended to see the world in rigid black and white terms; for example, either you were a member of a particular group, or you were not. Authoritarians showed patterns of submissive obedience to authority figures, but showed punitive rejection of groups other than their own. In many ways, the typical authoritarian was the embodiment of the stereotyped Nazi, including the implied negative criticism of such a comparison. Links between authoritarianism and the psychodynamic approaches outlined above lie in the assumed developmental features of the authoritarian. These are thought to be the result of early childhood experiences and parenting practices, and draw on conceptual assumptions similar to psychodynamic accounts.

We can see that the concept of authoritarianism seeks directly to link personality with one aspect of political behaviour. Its influence on both psychological thinking and more general approaches to understanding political extremism, especially of the right, has been considerable. Unfortunately, when more detailed analyses of the relationship between authoritarianism (as measured on the scale developed by Adorno et al.) and actual behaviour as distinct from attitudes are undertaken, the assumed causal qualities of authoritarianism are far from clear. Ray<sup>20</sup>, for example, reviews this area, and coherently analyses and discusses many of the empirical weaknesses in studies addressing the concept of authoritarianism. As with the more explicit psychodynamic accounts, and for broadly similar reasons, the concept of authoritarianism as a fundamental basis for ideology seems wanting.

An approach from a different psychological tradition which attempts to relate ideology to personality can be seen in Eysenck's two factor theory of ideology. Eysenck assumes that the left-right dimension is also a psychological dimension, as well as political, as we have noted above in our discussion of his radicalism-conservatism scale. He introduced, however a second and more fundamental dimension along which personality attributes of ideology might be located - tough mindedness and tender mindedness<sup>21</sup>. The tough minded person is a materialist and pessimist; he is irreligious, fatalistic and sceptical. The tender minded person is idealistic, intellectual, concerned with free-will, and is religious and dogmatic. The tough minded person deals with the environment either with force (as a soldier might), or by manipulation (as a scientist might). The tender minded person "...deals with problems either by thinking (philosopher) or by believing (priest). The best way of describing this factor is by stressing the practical-theoretical dichotomy..."<sup>22</sup>.

Tough minded and tender minded are not themselves primary personality factors in Eysenck's terms, but are linked to personality by their relationship with Eysenck's concept of extraversion-intraversion. This is, in Eysenck's view<sup>23</sup>, a fundamental personality dimension, in contrast to the radicalism-conservative dimension, which he regards as an attitudinal dimension. The tough minded are related to extraversion, and the tender minded are related to introversion.

Eysenck's analysis is both stimulating and controversial. It has the virtue of having an empirical basis, in contrast to the Freudian speculations which characterise so much of this area, and this has important implications for the theories predictive power. Analyses of scores of politically active individuals on Eysenck's various scales have revealed provocative results, the most striking of which is the extent to which extreme left and right wing individuals (as identified by extremes of scores on the radicalism/conservatism scales) show similarities on the tough minded/tender minded scales. Both extreme right and left wingers show similar attributes of tough mindedness, favouring 'authoritarian' approaches to social organisation. This would certainly help us to make some sense of Post's observation<sup>24</sup> of the 'paradox of the conforming antiauthoritarian', the tendency of extreme left wing groups to be overtly and brutally conformist in the application of their radical ideology. It has to be noted, however, that other authors have

disagreed with Eysenck's analysis, and called into question the relationships he describes <sup>25</sup>.

Whether Eysenck's views can be supported or not, his approach does seem to represent a substantial development on the rather less specific and conceptually and empirically limited analyses based on Psychodynamic theory. It moves the explanation away from the hidden inner world of unconscious motives, and its fundamental theoretical assumptions are much more accessible to empirical analysis and assessment. As a theory, it results in a demythologising of political activity, and enables us to move closer to analyses of political behaviour. It also enables us to move away from the assumptions or implications of inadequacy in development which so often seem to be features of psychodynamic explanations of the supporters of extreme ideologies. On the other hand, its proposed relationship of political activity to inherent (and in Eysenck's terms) genetically determined qualities of the individual, such as extraversion and introversion, seems to leave little room for situational influences. Yet an inescapable and fundamental feature of political activity, especially as we have noted it in the context of political violence, is the importance of situational and environmental factors.

#### Ideology as Rule following behaviour

We now move away from the analysis of ideology from a broad psychological perspective, to a more specific behavioural analysis. The discussion that follows in the next two sections is somewhat technical, drawing on concepts from a specialised area of psychology. The basic approach is not that complex, however, and the reader who wishes to avoid the technicalities can skip the next two sections of this Chapter, moving to the summary at the end of the section on Fanatical and violent political behaviour as rule governed behaviour.

The fundamental problem with the approaches to ideology we have encountered so far is their reliance on essentially mentalistic concepts to explain behaviour. They seek to explain behaviour by reference to internal predisposing states, a point of view which seems both lacking in empirical support and unnecessarily limiting in conceptual terms. This criticism applies as much to Eysenck as to other authors. Furthermore, perhaps because such explanations 'push' accounts of behaviour inside the individual (in terms of thoughts, attitudes, traits, etc.) such authors also begin to consider ideology as something separate from, and outside of, the broader framework in which politics as an aspect of social living, takes place.

In particular, they fail to make a fundamental distinction between ideology as a process structuring and influencing behaviour, and the content of particular ideologies. The extent to which ideology controls and influences our behaviour can be seen as something apart from particular ideological prescriptions, the content of ideology. This distinction is an important one to make, and relates to the distinction made in Chapter 1 between becoming involved in some activity, and the circumstances surrounding and controlling a particular action. It enables us to look at ideology as a multifaceted force influencing behaviour. At one level, we can see the role of ideology in providing the direction and coherence of behaviour in terms of particular ideological prescriptions. But perhaps more importantly, we can see at another level why certain kinds of ideologies become strong controllers of behaviour. We will look for understanding of these forces in those processes we know to control other behaviour - the environmental and contextual forces we have referred to in Chapter 1 as contingencies of reinforcement.

A behavioural account undoubtedly has some prospect of remedying the deficiencies noted above. Yet at first sight, behavioural approaches of the kind we have discussed in Chapter 1 also seem lacking in some respects. Accounts of the

direction and control of behaviour in terms of environmental consequences, (such as reinforcement) are unquestionably powerful when applied to circumstances where we can identify a direct relationships between behaviour and reinforcing (or aversive) consequence. If we do something, and immediately we receive a reward of some kind, the controlling effect of the reward on subsequent behaviour will be readily apparent. Accounts of this kind seem lacking, however, when they are applied to behaviour determined and controlled by more distant ends. Yet it is of course the importance of such distant ends that characterises both religious and secular ideological behaviour. The political activist may immerse himself in meetings, protest, etc. on a day to day level, and we can readily enough identify immediate reinforcers in the nature of the friendships formed, social contact and group approval. But of course the political activist's behaviour is also directed towards the attainment of some more distant and general objective, such as changing the political party in power, effecting some change in the law or change in more general social conditions, or even the overthrow of society and its replacement by a new and better order. How can the day to day behaviour we observe to be the stuff of politics be related in any direct sense to outcomes of this kind, when such outcomes are so far removed and distant from the particular behaviour we are concerned with?

One useful way of explaining the effectiveness of control of delayed outcomes on present behaviour is to propose some form of chaining, whereby particular relationships of behaviour and consequence are directly linked, one to the other, to the more distant end. Thus, we can envisage a complex sequence of events, each related to the next, that might explain an individual joining a political group, becoming more and more involved in it, and finally moving towards violent political activity of some form. Such a chain would envisage an incremental movement towards the distant behaviour state through a complex series of inter-related activities. Models reflecting this approach can be identified in the literature on terrorism, and we will use this area in the following as a specific example of the more general issue of fanaticism. The increasing involvement of the West German terrorist, Michael Baumann, (founder of the 2nd of June Movement) described by Kellen <sup>26</sup> illustrates this. Like many terrorists, Baumann did not suddenly embark upon a terrorist career. Rather, he seems to have gradually moved towards it as he become increasingly marginalised from society, drifting into political radicalism, and eventually terrorism. As his increased involvement developed, so other associated events helped to sustain him. It is worth noting that the attractions of his life style increased as he became more marginalised, for as he notes, "...if you had long hair, there were always an incredible number of chicks hanging on to you..." <sup>27</sup>. The inter-relationships of the various factors associated with his development as a terrorist are inevitably highly idiosyncratic, and difficult to anticipate, yet on looking back, a chain of inter-related events can be discerned. A process of this kind is inevitably peculiar to the individual involved, although nevertheless lawful to the observer given hindsight. An explanation in these terms has already been anticipated somewhat in Chapter 3, in the discussion of developmental and 'involvement' processes in the development of fanaticism.

Even if idiosyncratic, the processes whereby a person becomes a member of a terrorist group, and the incremental approach to violence that might imply, may well be forceably explained in these terms. Expressed generally, the starting point for an individual, a sense of injustice, a particular precipitating event, or even more remotely a friendship, may appear very far removed from a terminal point, placing a bomb or shooting a policeman. But we could readily envisage a process whereby they would be linked through a complex sequence of interlocking but idiosyncratic circumstances. We would be developing in such an explanation an account of the 'internal' logic of that behaviour, which of course would contrast with its apparent illogicality when viewed from the perspective of broader social norms and expectations. Social psychological processes of the kind described in Chapter 3, such as entrapment, would readily fit within this framework, interacting with and shaping the chained and incrementally progressing behavioural sequences.



Yet even when viewed from a terminal point and with the benefit of hindsight, the process of 'becoming' a terrorist in these terms may seem obscure and difficult to understand. In the particular case of terrorism, the behaviour involved grossly departs from normal rules of conduct and expectations. In these circumstances, rather than look for lawful behavioural relationships as explanations as we have above, we may feel we should have recourse to explanations in terms of mental illness or deviance in some sense to help us to understand what seems to be inexplicable behaviour. If we could clearly see the sequence of events that led to that point of placing a bomb, and if we could recognise the complex series of reciprocal relationships between particular behaviour and outcomes, the logic of development may well become clearer, and appear less mysterious. The difficulty is, of course, that such clarity of hindsight is not generally possible. Detailed reconstruction of the events which might determine a particular behaviour, however simple, is something that in complex social settings can only ever be imperfectly guessed at. All is not negative, however. Explanations of these kinds have utility in some circumstances, by at least offering a framework for further analysis, removing the behaviour in question from the realms of inaccessibility. Taylor and Ryan<sup>28</sup>, for example, have used this kind of explanation to attempt to describe the development of fanatical behaviour in the context of terrorist violence, by drawing on the idea of incremental development in terms of chains of behaviour.

But there are further difficulties with such explanations. The most important one is that they appear to be both unnecessarily mechanistic and deterministic, and dependent on post hoc analysis. Indeed, this is of course the same kind of criticisms that can be leveled at Freudian and Psychoanalytic explanations. The length of chain that would need to be postulated to explain any particular behaviour in these terms may well be of enormous length, stretching (literally and metaphorically) the credibility of the analysis. Equally, whilst behaviour may well be determined by the contemporary and historical environment in which it occurs, analyses of this form over-emphasise the inevitability of particular circumstances, giving a false sense of predictability and inevitability. One certain feature of the development of the terrorist, for example, is that whilst many people experience circumstances that may be correlated with induction into a terrorist life style, relatively few people actually become violent terrorists<sup>29</sup>.

Another and perhaps fundamentally problematic aspect of such explanations is the implicit assumption that behaviour has a beginning and, more particularly, an end from which we can look back in analysis. This seems to ignore the reciprocity and dynamism of behaviour, devaluing the flexibility which seems to characterise it, and assuming a linear relationship between environmental events and behaviour. Such criticism should not necessarily result in a rejection of this kind of explanation, however; but the limitations it implies should be recognised.

An alternative analysis from a behavioural base perspective is to develop explanations in terms of what has been called rule following<sup>30</sup>. The control exercised by distant outcomes which is so much a feature of all behaviour, not just political behaviour, may well be better characterised as being mediated by a rule which relates those distant outcomes to particular behaviours, rather than by an inevitable chain of responses and consequences. A rule is a verbal description of relationships between behaviours and consequences, especially aversive events and reinforcement. "If you touch that stove when its hot, you'll burn yourself," or "Tell that joke to Jim, he'll like it" are very simple examples of behavioural rules. They describe what is technically referred to as a behavioural contingency, or relationship between an event and behaviour. A behavioural contingency consists of a description of a response, a description of an outcome, and the identification of circumstances of some form in the presence of which the response will produce that outcome. Those circumstances in which a response will produce the outcome are technically referred to as discriminative stimuli. In the example above, in the presence of a hot stove (...a discriminative stimulus...), touching that stove (...a

response...) will present an aversive burn (...an outcome...). Another simple example might be the events that confront a comedian, where in the presence of a receptive audience (a discriminative stimulus), telling a joke (a response) will produce a rewarding laugh (an outcome) <sup>31</sup>.

A rule, therefore, is a generalisation about the circumstances that control behaviour (both positive and negative) that have applied in the past, or will apply in the future. Another way of expressing this relationship is to refer to contingency rules. The examples given above illustrate simple contingency rules that might exist. The first, for example, is of the form that might be taught to a child, the second is perhaps a more complex example. In the former, the particular environmental event that will produce the aversive outcome (the discriminative stimulus) is the stove, in the latter it is a receptive audience. Outcomes, of course can be positive or negative, again as illustrated above.

In terms of understanding complex behaviour, the utility of an analysis in terms of contingency rules can be contrasted with the chain analysis of ideological behaviour detailed above. The chain analysis emphasises the importance of immediate acting circumstances in the control of behaviour. Such behaviour might be termed contingency controlled, as opposed to rule-governed. The distant outcomes in themselves have no necessary relationship with the immediate controlling contingencies. The individual might 'drift' towards something (like involvement with terrorism), but that eventual state has little or no relationship with the particular circumstances that affect the individual at any given time. An analysis in terms of contingency rules, on the other hand, emphasises the relationship between present behaviour, and some deferred consequences. The rule effectively mediates between present behaviour and that deferred or distant consequence. By drawing on the same explanatory and conceptual framework, therefore, we can identify two very powerful but different kinds of explanation. Presumably in any given complex situation, we will not be concerned with them individually, but in some kind of reciprocal combination.

The postulation of such contingency rules does not imply mentalistic explanations of the kind referred to earlier in our description of psychological approaches to ideology. The importance of introducing the concept of rules lies not in substituting one obscure kind of explanation with another <sup>32</sup>. Rather, by looking at rules as verbal descriptions (for both the speaker and the listener <sup>33</sup>) mediating distant outcomes to immediate behaviour, we are indicating a process whereby such rules might develop which is both consistent with and complementary to other kinds of behavioural explanations. It recognises and draws upon the powerful situational forces which we know to control behaviour, and places them in a context which enables us to explain the complex organised qualities of behaviour over time.

Rules can be abstractions from inevitable immediate environmental contingencies, or they can be abstractions or analyses of contingencies that have occurred, or will occur. One very powerful form of rule noted by Skinner <sup>34</sup> which is based on the latter, is an ethical, religious or government law. These are almost invariably injunctions (for example, the sixth commandments instructs "Thou shall not commit adultery"), although in application, the injunctive quality may be softened, resulting in a description of immediate contingencies ('if you do, I will leave you'). That very softening reflects the combination of a contingency rule (the commandment) with an immediate circumstance (or contingency) affecting present behaviour referred to above. Indeed, the notion of ideology as we have discussed it in this Chapter fits into this particular framework for rules, in that ideology frequently is a series of injunctive prescriptions of behaviour, which on analysis soften to more explicit descriptions of immediate contingencies. We might even describe this contingency based softening of ideology as the pragmatic process of politics <sup>35</sup>. In summary, for the purposes of our discussion here, it is sufficient to note that rule following behaviour offers a means of relating distant objectives



and outcomes to immediate activity.

In elaborating on Rokeach's definition of ideology at the beginning of this chapter, we referred to ideology as "...a common and broadly agreed set of rules to which an individual subscribes which help to regulate and determine behaviour". The utility of this definition is now apparent. Ideology gives the individual a set of rules that help to determine behaviour. The circumstances in which behaviour occurs gains its 'meaning', or perhaps we should say its apparent purposiveness, by reference to some distant end. This end is expressed in terms of a rule, rather than by reference to the immediate circumstances prevailing at the time. The distant end therefore shapes and conditions behaviour. In analysing the process of this, we can begin to see interrelationships between what might otherwise seem very disparate and unrelated activities. By reference to rules in this sense, for example, we can readily see the way in which rules can substitute for, and "short-circuit", experience of particular behavioural contingencies.

Thus the political activist takes part in a variety of activities, all of which are structured around and controlled by broad ideological rules which control his behaviour. The source of the rules are authority of some kind, and they are expressed in some transmittable verbal medium (like writing, for example). The importance of transmission of verbal rules through some medium is of considerable conceptual importance in this analysis<sup>36</sup>, and of course this is a particularly appropriate quality for analyses of political ideology. Thus, the rules that structure our behaviour come from the Bible, the writings of Marx, Hitler's 'Mein Kampf', and so on. Usually, the rules expressed in works of this kind are very general, and do not offer particular detailed prescriptions for behaviour. We therefore see the development of additional rules elaborating and expanding on the original rules, through commentaries and Papal encyclicals. These ancillary developments may well more closely relate to immediate contingencies. It is not without significance that a feature of the ideologically committed (both secular and religious) is their regular attendance at study groups, discussion forums and services at which the general rules are worked out into a more particular form. Thus the general ideological rules become expressed in more particular ways such that the individual can both more readily learn them, and the behavioural contingencies implied by the rules more readily and effectively exert their influence.

In passing, we might also note the important immediate circumstances which will also apply in this process, and may serve to interact with and supplement the more distant rule related contingencies. Meetings and discussions of the kind noted above, may serve to refine ideological prescriptions, but they also exercise considerable control over behaviour themselves, through social reinforcement and the forces of group behaviour we have already discussed. Thus, when looking at the long term focus of rules, we cannot ignore more immediate contingencies that might act as subsidiary supports.

Rules do not exercise perfect control over behaviour. Even the most enthusiastic devotee to a religion may from time to time lapse and sin (the strength of the rule governed contingency, however, might be indicated by the extent to which he is aware of sinning and the nature of that awareness). We can say in general that the degree of control the environment exercises over behaviour is related to the kind of reinforcing contingencies that might operate on an individual. The most important element of this is the adequacy or otherwise of the reinforcing consequences in such contingencies. Where the relationship between behaviour and its consequences are unclear, or where the consequences are not particularly distinctive or are perhaps multiple, so the particular control of any one contingency over behaviour will be less than absolute.

Likewise, we need not assume that all rules when expressed are necessarily effective. Malott <sup>37</sup> distinguishes between 'hard-to-follow' rules and 'easy-to-follow' rules. The 'easy-to-follow' rules describe relationships where behaviour will produce an outcome which is probable and sizable, even if delayed; they may also involve other probable and sizable subsidiary contingencies (for example, aided perhaps by study groups, social contact, and other qualities of the environment in which the individual lives as we have noted above). We might embark on an arduous programme of study, not because we are reinforced by reading course books, but because at the end of the programme, we receive a degree or diploma that makes it more likely that we might earn a higher income. A considerable aid to this process (as any evening student will know) is the informal contact a student has with others in his position. In a more technical discussion, Cerutti <sup>38</sup> has referred to subsidiary contingencies of this kind as 'collateral consequences'.

'Hard-to-follow' rules, in contrast, describes contingencies that are either improbable or have outcomes that are small (in terms of either aversive or reinforcing consequences), and are perhaps lacking in subsidiary 'easy-to-follow' rules. We might also envisage circumstances where rules might conflict - for example, some of the health related activities we should perform to ensure a healthy future may conflict with other rule determined behaviours related to earning a living, or making professional or occupational progress. Thus, we might work in unhealthy or dangerous environments placing health at risk where the balance of rules related to occupational advancement are more powerful in terms of outcomes.

Developing this theme, therefore, we might describe someone who is ideologically committed, as being under the control of particular rules, derived from whatever ideological source. The origins of such control lie in the normal learning processes which we are familiar with, and relate to the situational consequences of behaviour. It is important to stress that whilst this may appear to be a relatively simple and straightforward explanation of how ideology might come to occupy an important role for an individual, the processes that will occur for that individual will of necessity be complex, reciprocal and interactive. An explanation of the behaviour may be made by reference to relatively simple processes, but the operation of the processes we have identified may well be extraordinarily complex.

We should note that whilst we have drawn attention to the role that rule following might have in explanations of ideologically activity, this is not to say that this explanation only serves this form of behaviour. Rather, it would seem likely that all forms of behaviour are subject to the control of rules of some form. The difference between the ideologically committed and others is that perhaps for the ideological, the rules can be expressed in a relatively clear way. Ideology is necessarily transmittable through a verbal or analogous medium. Furthermore, such rules may be 'easy-to-follow', and as we noted earlier, have a measure of cohesion and strength because they are expressed. Indeed, by virtue of being expressed, they may gain further cohesion and power through specifying clearer relationships. Thus the behaviour of the ideologically committed may appear more organised and directed because the rules are more clearly articulated and interrelate in clearer, logical and powerful ways. The relationships between immediate and distant outcomes becomes, therefore, more explicit, and able to exercise closer control over behaviour. In summary, therefore, our behaviour whether ideologically based or otherwise, remains both controlled by rules relating distant outcomes to immediate events, and by immediate contingencies. For the ideological, the rules may be more explicit and logical, and additionally supported by powerful subsidiary contingencies.

This analysis is somewhat speculative, in that empirical verification of these concepts in terms of the large scale activities implied by political behaviour are lacking. On the other hand, the analysis offers considerable conceptual advantages over other psychological speculations in this area. By relating ideology to rule following behaviour, we are

describing a process whereby particular ideologies, expressed in rules, gain control and influence over behaviour. It also offers us a perspective from which to analyse particular ideologies, for given such a process, we can now look at the functional relationships of particular political activity. In general terms, the position advanced here is not a unique development in analyses of political behaviour. It bears some similarities with other perspectives emphasising functional relationships, such as that developed by Dietrich<sup>39</sup> of the rise to power of the Nazi party. However, in contrast to the position developed here, Dietrich's analysis is based on the related area of Social Behaviourist principles<sup>40</sup>. Skinner's notion of rules seems to be an important conceptual advance over Social Learning Theory in the area we are concerned with, however, offering a specificity in analysis which is consistent with the power to apply it to more general situations.

#### Fanatical and violent political behaviour as rule governed behaviour

From this short analysis, we can see how ideology seen as the expression of explicit and internally cohesive and logical contingency rules, helps to relate distant events to immediate behaviour. Our analysis does not need to draw on special explanations, but rather uses existing powerful explanatory frameworks. By referring to rule governed behaviour, we can see how ideology relates to authority (as the source of rules), and how ideology provides rules that determine our behaviour. The focussed way in which the political fanatic, for example, seems bounded by his ideological assumptions to the exclusion of all else (as discussed at length in Chapter 2) illustrates in a simple way the rigid and insensitive nature of rule governance.

This approach also sets the scene for an analysis of the relationship between political violence and ideology, in terms of a framework in which particular ideological priorities might be expressed. An important implication of this discussion is that in the conceptual terms discussed here, political violence is not necessarily a primary, and therefore distinctive, quality of either ideology or the politically active, although it may be that violence is more likely in some ideologies than others. Nor need we look for particular individual qualities that allows for the expression of that violence. Rather, violence can be seen as an instrumental quality of ideology, its incidence being determined by the interaction of ideology as contingency rules, the particular content of ideology, local and immediate behavioural contingencies and situational factors. Indeed, under some circumstances, violence may simply be a rather minor element linked with, and subsidiary to, other more powerful controlling contingencies. The effects of such violence may, of course, be profound on the recipient, or the society in which such violence takes place, but as far as the violent person is concerned, it may well be an incidental element in the broader contingencies controlling behaviour.

In attempting to understand the determinants of ideological behaviour from this perspective, we can assume that both immediate contingency relationships, and more distant rule-governed contingencies interact and control our behaviour. As far as rule governed contingencies are concerned, they may exercise effective control or ineffectively control. For most people, we can see examples of both kinds of rule following, and the contradictions and uncertainties we observe in people's behaviour may be related to the balance of effective and ineffective rules, or the conflict between rules. It is reasonable to assume that such a balance is related at least in part to the degree to which rules are articulated. The case of the fanatic seems to represent a situation where a form of ideological rule exercises extensive and powerful control over behaviour.

Such effectiveness of control may indicate the main reason for the distinctive rigidity of the fanatics behaviour. A feature of the fanatic we have noted earlier in Chapter 2 is his remorseless and unshakable adherence to a particular position, and to the logical following through of that position regardless of whether such behaviour conflicts with

moral prescriptions. Perhaps what we see in the fanatic is an individual showing in fact two distinctive qualities of behavioural control. The first is that the fanatics behaviour is under close control of ideological rules (in the sense of effective rules used above) which by virtue of their origins are for that individual easy-to-follow rules, or have similar strength through subsidiary consequences and supports. The second quality is that circumstances or contingencies in his immediate environment exercise reduced control over behaviour, with limited or no supportive contingencies. It has been recognised that close control by rule following contingencies results in insensitivity of behaviour to immediate circumstances <sup>41</sup>. Such insensitivity in the particular circumstances we are concerned with may be a very significant element in the development of this particular quality of fanaticism. Indeed, Skinner <sup>42</sup> describes many of the features of behaviour which we have identified as fanatical in Chapter 2 in terms of the qualities which he sees as typical of rule-governed behaviour - lack of variety in responses and reasons, an emphasis on truth, and so on.

We noted in Chapter 2 that the fanatics behaviour can be thought of as having qualities similar to those of normal people, differing along a continuum of some kind, rather than differing in absolute terms. Perhaps one way of characterising that continuum is in terms of the extent to which the fanatic's behaviour is closely controlled by a limited set of rules which are relatively constrained in extent and closely interrelated. This contrasts with the relative multiplicity of rules that might control normal behaviour, and the extent of control exercised by immediate circumstances.

If we express this difference in such a way, this is not simply a tautology, nor is it an elaborate version of the kinds of mentalistic accounts noted above. An individual can be 'fanatical' about a variety of things - he might fanatically follow a sport or become wholly absorbed and involved in an aspect of work. All are examples of the control exercised by behavioural rules. The nature of the particular rule following behaviour will clearly determine the focus. The distinctive quality of fanatical political behaviour is the extent of control which is itself a reflection of the all embracing qualities of political ideology, in contrast to the limited scope of sport related rules, for example. In describing ideologically controlled behaviour in this way, and in particular by relating it to the behaviour of the fanatic, we are not therefore only describing the nature of behavioural control, but also describing the processes whereby such control develops. This seems to be an advance on other ways of conceptualising the problem.

We can also now distinguish between the processes that might allow the expression of ideology, and the qualities of a particular ideology. Rules refer to the set of contingencies relating distant outcomes to behaviour (the process of ideology). On the other hand, the particular content of rules (or in technical terms, the contingencies they imply) refer to their ideological content and prescriptions. The content qualities of ideology, whilst relating to more general rules, are likely to involve more immediate circumstances, relating to events on a day to day level. This distinction is probably most apparent in religious ideologies, where there is often a very direct link established between behaviour and ideology. Particular activities relate to ideological prescriptions, through subsidiary activities such as prayer, retreats and abstention from particular foods.

This approach, therefore, seems to free the analysis from the constraints imposed by political conceptual consistency, and the assumption that political consistency also characterises behavioural consistency. Left-right might be a useful category for political analysis, as a means of describing ideological content, but we do not now need to seek some inherent psychological or behavioural meaning in that description, nor look for meaning in terms of particular personal attributes. We are also now able to look at ideology in terms of function and utility for the individual, rather than

seeing ideological content as something that exists in its own right without reference to the behavioural contingencies it might create.

#### Summary: Ideology and Rule Following

This summary reviews the principal areas of discussion of the last two sections.

1. A fundamental distinction is made between ideology as a process structuring and influencing behaviour and the content of a particular ideology.
2. A characteristic of ideological behaviour is its concern with distant, and probably ultimate ends, perhaps related to social change, or religious fulfillment. This can be distinguished from the more immediate circumstances that constitute subsidiary elements of that larger process that might be characterised as political behaviour.
3. Traditional behaviour analyses relate immediate circumstances to distant ends through some kind of chain of circumstances, resulting in perhaps incremental development of someone towards the distant end. The weakness of this approach when applied to political behaviour is that it is heavily dependant on hindsight. The end either seems accidental rather than deliberate, or it implies an inappropriately mechanistic and deterministic view of human behaviour, which is not borne out by everyday experience. This fails to capture the essential quality of political behaviour, which is that it does have a coherence and direction over time.
4. An alternative way of relating distant ends to immediate behaviour is through the concept of rule following. A behavioural rule relates a distant outcome to particular behaviour. A rule is a generalisation about the circumstances that control behaviour.
5. The process of ideology can be characterised in behavioural terms as "...a common and broadly agreed set of rules to which an individual subscribes which help to regulate and determine behaviour"
6. The actual control over behaviour at any given time is the result of the inter-relationship between immediate circumstances and rule related distant outcomes.
7. Fanatical behaviour can be characterised as behaviour under powerful and effective rule control, with reduced control of immediate circumstances. This helps to explain the rigidity, insensitivity and focussing of fanatical behaviour.
8. The difference between fanatical behaviour and normal behaviour can be thought of in terms of a continuum reflecting degree of control by behavioural rules. The fanatic's behaviour is closely controlled by a limited set of rules which are relatively constrained in extent and are closely related. This contrasts with the relative multiplicity of rules that might control normal behaviour, and the extent of control exercised by immediate circumstances.

#### The context of ideology: Militancy

We can now turn to our principle concern: how ideology becomes associated with violence. In the remaining discussion of this chapter, and in the next two chapters, we will be concerned with this issue. We have noted that the process of ideology can be conceptualised in terms of rules, but such rules have particular qualities by virtue of their content and nature, that relates to the expression of violent behaviour. Two principal qualities of the process of ideology will be discussed in the next two Chapters in relation to their capacity to facilitate violence - millenarianism as particular qualities of ideological content, and lack of public space as a quality of the process of ideological control over behaviour. A particular quality of ideological content - militancy - that clearly relates to violence will be disposed of relatively briefly in this chapter.

We can see violence in ideology as an aspect not simply of the process of ideology (as may be the case with millenarianism and public space as we will see later), but also the expression and articulation of the qualities of

particular ideological content, expressed as rules (in this behavioural sense), which characterise that ideology. This is an important point to make, for in the context of a militant ideology, it emphasises the relationship between ideological rules (perhaps expressed in a general way as rhetoric) and behaviour. This in turn enables us to separate out kinds of ideology related to violence by relating its rhetorical expression to particular behaviour. We might even envisage a continuum of ideological expression that relates to violence, and we might see that expression in the articulation of that ideology, in whatever form it takes.

The extent of violent and combative rhetoric in any particular ideology can be described as its degree of militancy. Militancy is clearly the most obvious content quality of potentially fanatical ideologies that has a bearing on the expression of violent behaviour. We can distinguish between ideologies that directly relate militancy to behaviour, and ideologies that have militant, combative potential which in some circumstances can lead to violence. Ideologies that explicitly encourage violence as a means of attaining a desired goal may be relatively rare, but perhaps can be seen in some anarchist movements, such as Nihilism. The Nilhists had their ideological origins in the writings of Sergei Nechayev, and aspired to the destruction of society to prepare for a better, utopian, order to replace it. As far as Nechayev was concerned, the revolutionary who would achieve this desirable utopian end state "...knows only a single science: the science of destruction." Sometimes, the term 'propaganda of the deed' was used to describe Nechayev's views, which of course emphasises the direct behavioural references to his ideology. If we could express Nilhist ideology in terms of behavioural rules, they would of course directly relate destructive violence to positive distant outcomes in terms of a changed social order.

Nihilism is not typical of ideologies involving violence, however. It is unusual to find explicit violence expressed as an essential and necessary element of an ideology. More usual is a less direct relationship with violence, where militancy rather than violence better expresses its focus. Revolutionary ideologies in themselves, because they look forward to some better state, do not necessarily prescribe violent behaviour. The anticipated change might be achieved through gradual change, or political activity through democratic institutions. But in circumstances where the ideology indicates means to achieve the desirable end state, interference with such means may well have the potential for expression in violence. In circumstances where ideology is expressed in terms of inevitable outcomes (the fulfillment of the class war, for example, or the attainment of the thousand year Reich) and where personal action may play a part in attaining or hastening the attainment of the political objective, so there may be a particular potential for violence. This is discussed at some length in the next chapter in the context of Millenarianism.

Where ideological rhetoric makes reference to 'cleansing the world' of some racial group, such as the Jews, we can see at its clearest the origins of rule governed contingencies relating behaviour to violence. More subtly, but equally clearly, we can see how Qur'anic injunctions and consequences to apostasy in Islam can result in attempted violence against the author Salman Rushdie after the publication of his book 'The Satanic Verses'. These examples illustrate how explicitly militant expression of ideology can in turn gain expression through violent behaviour.

In pursuing the discussion developed in this Chapter, we can also speculate about a further way in which once violence is introduced into ideologically determined behaviour it may increase in occurrence. The immediacy of consequence to violent behaviour has already been noted in Chapter 2 as a powerful reason for its persistence, despite frequent social disapproval. Such immediacy of effect may be important in enhancing the relative importance of a narrowly defined and limited array of contingency or controlling relationships. Thus, those behaviours that result in violence may be reinforced by fulfilling ideological priorities, establishing powerful contingency relationships within the overall context



of broader ideologically specified rule-governed contingencies. We can see examples of this in the way in which Allen<sup>43</sup> describes the way in which the Nazi's came to power in the German town of Northeim. The selective victimisation of townspeople, the sporadic upsurges in violence related to electioneering, all indicate the action of local and essentially immediate factors, which whilst they were consistent with the broader Nazi ideological framework, also seemed to enhance the commitment of the committed by creating a sense of progress and change.

Attempts have been made to relate notions of the kind described above to the development of more macro-social units, such as cultures. This is not the same as ideology, of course, and perhaps addresses a level of analyses even more general than that addressed here. Malott<sup>44</sup> and Glenn<sup>45</sup> introduce and develop these ideas in the context of cultural anthropology, drawing on the work of Harris<sup>46</sup> and the approach to anthropology known as Cultural Materialism. This is an empirical analysis of cultural entities drawing on similar assumptions to those developed here, especially the primacy of behavioural approaches. The details of this analysis need not particularly concern us, however, other than to note the broader generality of explanations of macro-social processes in terms of rule following behaviour.

The distinctions we have made in this Chapter helps us, therefore, to analyse ideologically determined behaviour. One further issue remains - how do the contingency relationships we have described as ideology come to affect an individual? Why does an ideology with one set of attributes come to be chosen (or exercise influence) rather than another? In practice, the answer to this question may prove very complex. Some ideologies seem to be expressed in terms of 'easy-to-follow' contingency rules, and this in itself may account for their spread. It is often asserted, for example, that Islam has continued to grow and gain adherents amongst tribal peoples because it is so attractive, offering a relatively simple and direct route to salvation expressed in terms meaningful to native peoples.

The importance of the certainty which an ideology offers should not be underestimated as an attracting force. Nor should the role of ideology in meeting an individual's sense of belonging be underestimated. In both circumstances, adopting an ideology (at a cognitive and social level) may serve as a powerful mechanism for reducing social anxiety. Indeed, there are well established relationships between fear and anxiety and an increased desire to be with others<sup>47</sup> (referred to as affiliation). The basis of this seems to be a reduction in anxiety produced by the presence of others. It is important to stress, however, that whilst the pathologically anxious may well find strength, support and relief from adherence to an ideology, this is not to suggest that ideologically committed people necessarily suffer chronic anxiety, or are insecure or in need of social affiliation. Some perhaps are, but many are not. It would be wrong and misleading to assume that there are special reasons that can be identified for adherence to an ideology, any more than similar special reasons are necessary to explain any of life's choices.

This last point needs to be stressed. Despite the inevitable uncertainties of analyses of this kind, we can say with some confidence that we do not need to produce special accounts of ideological behaviour which are different from accounts we might make of other kinds of behaviour. Understanding the processes of why a particular ideology comes to control behaviour makes reference to no less (and probably no more) complex events than those involved in understanding any of the choices associated with major life events, such as career choices. Our analysis of ideology here (and similarly terrorism in Taylor<sup>48</sup>) draws on, therefore, the kinds of structures and concepts that we might use to describe other complex behaviours, and will presumably be expressed in terms which will include amongst other things early experiences, the learning and development of particular contingency rules and the reciprocal influences of social reinforcement through group membership. The list will be long, sometimes idiosyncratic and undoubtedly complex,

reflecting situational, familial and social influences. We should also note that in some cases (or perhaps even many), there might even be no other explanation than the fortuitous combination of circumstance.

### Overview

We have in this chapter discussed the nature of ideology, and attempted to develop the notion of ideology in a behavioural context, as distinct from a psychological or political context. We have identified ideology as 'a common and broadly agreed set of rules which regulate and determine behaviour' where a rule is a verbal description of a behavioural contingency, relating distant outcomes to immediate behaviour. Ideological rules, therefore, relate both to the nature of behavioural control, and to the process of expression of ideological content. We must look to the particular content of any ideology to determine its potential for success in gaining adherents, and its potential for expression in violence, but we need also to look to the processes that allow ideological expression if we want to understand violent political behaviour.

Ideology, therefore, is little more than the collection of rules, more or less clearly articulated, but which gain coherence through expression, which relate distant consequences to immediate activity. To merit the term ideology, the rules must have some measure of coherence and internal consistency. Furthermore, the rules must have some measure of utility in some sense - at their simplest, the rules must help the individual attain the expressed ideological end state. In religions, this is difficult to judge, because in the main, the end state is something which occurs at death - you go to heaven (or hell). But of course other subscribers to a religion can't know if this is true. Utility in religions in this sense, therefore, has to be judged in other ways, perhaps by reference to subsidiary states. Political ideology can, however, be more readily judged in these terms. The subscriber to a political ideology can ultimately know, at least in principle, if the objectives are attained.

Analysing ideology in terms of rule following contingencies controlling behaviour offers attractive advantages. One of its principle benefits is that it offers a potential mechanism whereby broader social and political forces might influence behaviour. In the way in which we have used the concept, rule following may both complement and mediate the effects of social psychological processes on behaviour. The level of analysis presented here of course lacks specificity, and all that can be developed in this chapter is a broad outline of a general approach. For the purposes of this book, and its objectives, this is sufficient, although the professional reader will undoubtedly feel the need to examine the notions developed in greater detail. More detailed discussion of particular circumstances occurs to some extent in later chapters, when we look at ideological behaviour related to the Nazi movement, political suicides, terrorism and situations involving authority. What is clearly lacking in the analysis presented above is empirical verification of the concepts in appropriate situations. In this respect, this chapter might perhaps be regarded as setting an agenda for further research to elaborate on the behavioural concepts proposed.

If we turn our attention to the processes of ideology, we can identify qualities of ideology which, in the context of the militant ideology of particular interest to us, make expression in terms of violence more likely. Two of these processes are discussed below in the next two chapters - 'Millenarianism' as a further content element of ideology, and 'Public Space' as a process variable. Neither of these terms are derived from behaviour analysis, and they do not make particular reference in their normal usage, to behavioural concepts. Nevertheless, as we will see, they do complement and extend our behavioural analysis of ideology.



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We will anticipate the discussion somewhat, to place the next two chapters in context. It is proposed that there are factors related to particular kinds of ideology that make the expression of violence more likely. One of these we have noted already is in terms of the rhetoric of any given ideology, and the extent to which it prescribes violent behaviour, or has within it a considerable militant potential, either directly or as a result of other events. The two other factors which we will discuss in some detail in the next two chapters are Millenarianism and Public Space. The position developed here which relates Militancy, Millenarianism and Public Space, is that they in combination facilitate the expression of ideology as violent behaviour. The precise nature of such combination, their relative weighting, etc. may be unclear. But their presence, it is argued, is necessary to facilitate the expression of any ideology as violence.